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A. INTRODUCTION
1. The Arab-Israeli conflict has become the most prominent arena of regional and
international tension over the past century. Within the realm of modern international law,
the conflict has contributed greatly to the development of rule-making. The laws of war,
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the scope of international humanitarian and human rights law, the rights of refugees, the
centrality of self-determination, the laws on terrorism and the content of modern treatymaking – all have been significantly shaped by the norms established through the copious
resolutions, diplomatic statements and legal commentary on the many features of the
conflict. Yet, at the same time, the efficacy of international law has suffered because the
principal actors have marginalized it as a diplomatic tool by the parties and the
international community to shape a lasting peace in the region.
2. Since World War II, the international community has maintained a sustained focus on
Israel, Palestine and the region for at least four distinct but interrelated reasons. First,
three of the world‘s major religions – Christianity, Islam and Judaism – have strong
historical and spiritual roots in the region and specifically in Jerusalem. Empires and
nation-states with allegiances to each of these religions have ruled the territory that is
Israel/Palestine since the beginning of the 20th century. While the Arab-Israeli conflict
has little to do with theological differences, the religious overlay of what is essentially a
political and territorial conflict has added to its intensity.
3. Second, the creation of the State of Israel in 1948 captured the imagination of many
Western countries as an appropriate restitution for the horrors of the Jewish Holocaust in
Europe. At the same time, many in the Third World saw the rise of Zionism and the
dispossession by the Palestinians as an anachronistic example of settler colonialism,
arriving on the historical stage just as the great European colonial empires were exiting.
Since then, the Arab-Israeli conflict has become a flashpoint for the tensions between
North and South, Judeo-Christianity and Islam, industrialized and poor states, secularism
and belief, ethnicity and universalism, and colonialism and self-determination.
4. A third reason is that the conflict became an important political arena for the world‘s
superpowers. During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union competed for
regional political alliances, marketplaces for their military industries, and secure supplies
of oil and gas. Since 1990, the demise of the Soviet Union and the eclipse of Arab
nationalism have only intensified the engagement of the United States in the region.
During this time, America has fought wars in Kuwait, Iraq and Afghanistan, maintained
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its political estrangement with Iran, deepened its strategic relationship with Israel and
took the lead diplomatic role in the various unsuccessful peace processes between Israel
and the Palestinians, while continuing its quest for guaranteed energy sources.
5. Fourth, the Arab-Israeli conflict has become the most international of modern
international conflicts. The United Nations enabled the creation of the State of Israel, has
cared for millions of Palestinian refugees over six decades, established peacekeeping
missions, and closely monitored the ongoing conflict through volumes of resolutions and
reports. The international community has been intimately engaged in the region through
numerous diplomatic initiatives, massive arm sales and significant quantities of aid, trade,
grants and investment. The conflict has received more public, political, scholarly and
media attention than any other conflict in the modern world, all the while remaining
unresolved and malignant, a discouraging set-back for the effectiveness of international
law and diplomacy.
B MODERN HISTORY OF THE ARAB/ISRAELI CONFLICT

1 Palestine up to the League of Nations Mandate (1922)

6. The Zionist movement arose in pre-World War I Europe, primarily as a response to
widespread anti-Semitism and the recurrent cycles of discrimination and violence against
Jews. While other European Jewish movements organized around liberal emancipation or
socialism in response to anti-Jewish bigotry, the Zionist movement proposed that only
with the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine could Jews flourish as a people and live
free of the pogroms and the exclusionary laws and practices that plagued their
communities. Early Zionist writings on Palestine articulated the benefits of a new society
and an old-new language in an old-new land. [A. Hertzberg (ed.) The Zionist Idea (New
York: Antheneum, 1959)].

7. Political Zionism based its claim to Palestine as the Jewish homeland on the various
Jewish kingdoms that had existed in parts of Palestine for several hundred years after
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1200 BC. The land was subsequently conquered and ruled by a number of empires after
722 BC, including the Assyrians (circa 722 BC), the Babylonians (circa 670 BC), the
Persians (circa 530 BC), the Greeks (circa 331 BC) and the Romans (61 BC). The name
Israel finds its origins in the Israelite kingdom of the Old Testament, while the term
Palaestina dates from the Roman conquest. A series of unsuccessful Jewish revolts
against Roman rule in 70 and 132 AD led to the expulsion of the Jews from Jerusalem,
although significant numbers of Jews would live in Palestine until the Christian Crusades
around 1100 AD. After the Jewish revolts, most of the world‘s Jews were found in
Europe, North Africa and the Middle East, while small communities of Jews lived after
the end of the Crusades in Jerusalem and in various towns in Palestine, including Safed,
Hebron and Tiberias.

8. The Romans ruled Palestine until the fourth century AD, when they were succeeded by
the Byzantine Empire. In the seventh century, Muslim Arab armies from the Arabian
Peninsula conquered much of the region, including Palestine. Jerusalem was taken in 638
AD by the Caliph Omar. At the time of the Arab conquest, much of the population in
Palestine had become Christian under Byzantine rule. The Christian and Jewish
populations in Palestine were protected by the Arabs, and many subsequently adopted the
religion, culture and language of the Arab rulers. Muslim rule of Palestine was broken by
the Christian Crusades in 1099, but Muslims under Saladin re-conquered Jerusalem in
1187. The area was then ruled by a succession of Muslim empires, including the
Mamelukes of Egypt and, after 1517, the Ottoman Turks.

9.

The first Zionist Congress was held in Basel, Switzerland in 1897, under the primary
leadership of Theodor Herzl, a Viennese journalist and the author of Der Judenstaat (The
Jewish State). The programme adopted by the Congress stated that: ―The aim of Zionism
is to create for the Jewish people a home in Palestine secured by public law.‖ The Basel
programme called for Jewish settlement in Palestine and the procurement of diplomatic
support. [‗The Basle Programme‘ in JN Moore (ed.) The Arab-Israeli Conflict (Princeton:
American Society of International Law, 1974), vol. III, 4.]. In its first 20 years, the
Zionist movement steadily built a political, diplomatic and financial foundation, though
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in this period it did not achieve majority support among European Jews. (Sachar, Chapter
2).

10. On the eve of the First World War, Palestine had been part of the Turkish Ottoman
Empire for almost four centuries, and had been experiencing the first stirrings of Arab
nationalism. The small intellectual class – led by teachers, artists, army officers and
writers – were issuing appeals for more Arab culture and greater autonomy for the Arab
provinces. The Palestinian Arabs were predominately Muslims, with a significant and
prosperous Christian minority. They were largely an agrarian people, cultivating the
Galilee, the coastal plain and the inland hill country, with the rest living in such cities and
towns as Jerusalem, Gaza, Jaffa and Haifa. In the Galilee and the southern desert were
nomadic Bedouin Arabs. Many of Palestine‘s 85,000 Jews were living in Jerusalem,
where they formed a majority. [E. Rogan, The Arabs: A History (New York: Basic
Books, 2009) 149-174]. Abu-Lughod 141

11. The First World War broke out in August 1914, with Great Britain and the Ottoman
Empire on opposite sides. To encourage Arab support against the Turks, Britain promised
to support the independence of the Ottoman Arab provinces in the Levant if the Arabs
would join with the Allies against Germany and Turkey. In a series of letters exchanged
between Sir Henry McMahon, the British High Commissioner in Cairo and Hussein Ibn
Ali, Sherif of Mecca in 1915 and 1916, Great Britain stated that it was prepared to
support ―the independence of the Arabs in all of the regions within the limits demanded
by the Sherif‖, excluding only the areas along the northern Syrian coast between
Damascus and the Mediterranean, as these ―cannot be said to be purely Arab,‖ and the
provinces of Baghdad and Basra in Mesopotamia. [‗The Hussein-McMahon Letters‘, in
JN Moore, (ed.) The Arab-Israeli Conflict (Princeton: American Society of International
Law, 1974), vol. III, 9]. The Sherif, hoping to extend his rule beyond the Hejaz region of
the eastern Arabian Peninsula, subsequently fought with the British army based on these
undertakings.
12. However, on 16 May 1916, Great Britain and France concluded a secret agreement –
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the Sykes-Picot Agreement, named after the two negotiators, Sir Mark Sykes of Britain
and Charles Georges-Picot of France – whereby the two countries divided up the Arab
provinces of the Ottoman Empire into respective British and French zones of influence
which would take effect after the defeat of the Ottomans. The Agreement would give
Britain control over much of Mesopotamia, northern Arabia, Trans-Jordan and Gaza,
while France would receive Cilicia, the Syrian coast, Mosul, Aleppo and Damascus.
Palestine would come under a vaguely defined ―international administration.‖ [‗The
Sykes-Picot Agreement‘, in JN Moore, (ed.) The Arab-Israeli Conflict (Princeton:
American Society of International Law, 1974), vol. III, 25-28]. The Sykes-Picot
Agreement was made public by the Bolsheviks shortly after the Russian Revolution to
embarrass the Allies.

13. Great Britain made a third promise respecting Palestine to the Zionist movement. On
2 November 1917, the British Cabinet endorsed a letter written by Lord Balfour, the
British Foreign Secretary, to Lord Rothschild, a leading Zionist figure. The Balfour
Declaration stated: ‗His Majesty‘s Government view with favour the establishment in
Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people and will use their best endeavours to
facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be
done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish
communities in Palestine or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other
country.‘ [‗The Balfour Declaration‘ in JN Moore (ed.) The Arab-Israeli Conflict
(Princeton: American Society of International Law, 1974), vol. III, 32]. The Declaration
was a significant achievement for the Zionist movement and for its leader Dr. Chaim
Weizmann, enabling the movement to receive the political support of the most important
European power just as Great Britain was capturing Palestine from the Ottomans.
14. When the Balfour Declaration was issued, around 90 percent of Palestine‘s
population of approximately 670,000 inhabitants were Palestinian Arab Muslims and
Christians (600,000), while Jews comprised around 9 percent (56,000). [A. Shlaim, The
Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2001) 7]. The
end of the Ottoman Empire and the promise of independence by the Allies had created
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high expectations among the Arabs. They also shared a growing concern about Zionism
and its interest in Palestine. The King-Crane Commission was appointed by President
Woodrow Wilson of the United States in May 1919 to assess the future political options
of the former Ottoman Arab territories. It reported in August of that year that: ‗If [the
Wilsonian principle of self-determination] is to rule, and so the wishes of Palestine's
population are to be decisive as to what is to be done with Palestine, then it is to be
remembered that the non-Jewish population of Palestine – nearly nine tenths of the whole
– are emphatically against the entire Zionist program.‘ [‗Excerpt from the Report of the
American Section of the International Commission on Mandates in Turkey (The King
Crane Commission)‘ in JN Moore (ed.) The Arab-Israeli Conflict (Princeton: American
Society of International Law, 1974), vol. III, 57].

15. At Versailles in June 1919, the Allies adopted the Covenant of the League of Nations.
Article 22 created the Mandate system, whereby the colonies of the defeated Powers –
Germany, the Austrian-Hungarian Empire and the Ottoman Empire – were to be reconstituted as Mandates of the League of Nations, and awarded to specific European
countries. Paragraph 4 of Article 22 stated that the former Ottoman territories had
reached a stage of development where ―their existence as independent countries can be
provisionally recognized subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance
by a Mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone.‖ [‗Article 22 of the
Covenant of the League of Nations‘, in JN Moore (ed.) The Arab-Israeli Conflict
(Princeton: American Society of International Law, 1974), vol. III, 72]. To the
disappointment of the Arabs, the Versailles process did not grant them independence.

16. In July 1922, the Council of the League of Nations formalized the entrustment of the
Palestine Mandate to Great Britain. The Council decision had five important features.
First, it created a separate Mandate over Trans-Jordan, where Great Britain installed
Abdullah, son of the Sherif of Mecca, as King. The Jordan River and the Dead Sea
became the primary natural and political boundary between Palestine and Trans-Jordan.
Second, Britain was also given Mandate authority over Iraq (where it placed Faisal,
another son of the Sherif, as King), while France was awarded Syria and Lebanon. Third,
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the Mandate for Palestine incorporated the language of the Balfour Declaration,
promising a national home for the Jewish people in Palestine provided that the civil and
religious rights of the non-Jewish communities in Palestine were not prejudiced. It also
recognized the rights of ‗an appropriate Jewish agency‘ to operate as a public body to
assist the Mandatory in the establishment of a Jewish national home, and encouraged
Jewish immigration and the ‗close settlement by Jews of the lands'. Fourth, the Mandate
for Palestine did not specifically use the word ‗Arab‘; the Palestinians Arabs were
referred to only as ‗non-Jews‘. And fifth, Great Britain undertook to promote the
economic and political development of the country and to protect its religious and holy
places. [‗The Mandate of Palestine Confirmed by the Council of the League of Nations‘
in JN Moore (ed.) The Arab-Israeli Conflict (Princeton: American Society of
International Law, 1974), vol. III, 75-84; H. Sachar, A History of Israel (3rd ed.) (New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2007), 129.]

2 The Peel Commission and Proposals of Partition (1937)

17. With the British Mandate authority in Palestine favourable to its settlement goals, the
Zionist movement began to organize the migration of European Jews as part of its project
to build a homeland in Palestine. Through the 1920s and 1930s (particularly following
Adolf Hitler‘s rise to power in Germany in 1933), rising rates of immigration saw the
Jewish population in Palestine surge from 56,000 in 1917 to 175,000 in 1931 to 460,000
by 1939. In the inter-war period, the overall economy of Mandate Palestine grew with
Jewish immigration and capital, along with Mandate investment in infrastructure.
However, two distinct societies and economies were emerging, with separate Jewish and
Palestinian educational systems, industries, cultures, cities and neighbourhoods. The
Yishuv – the Jewish community in Palestine – established its own institutions to promote
autonomous development, such as the Jewish Agency, the Jewish National Fund, the
Histadrut (the Jewish trade union) and the Mapai party. Among the Palestinians, the Arab
Executive and the Supreme Muslim Council, led by the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, Haj
Amin al-Husseini, became their primary representative organs, although they were
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weakened by leadership struggles between the two leading Arab families in Jerusalem,
the Husseinis and the Nashashibis.

18. With the growing Jewish immigration, widespread fears among the Palestinians
respecting the rising threat to their majority status in their homeland resulted in violence
between the communities in 1920, 1921 and 1929 and a prolonged Palestinian revolt in
1936-39. In the wake of the 1929 violence, the British government appointed the Shaw
Commission to inquire into the causes of the violence. The Commission reported in
March 1930, assigning responsibility for the immediate violence to Grand Mufti of
Jerusalem Haj al-Husseini, and members of the Arab Executive. However, it also stated
that the underlying cause was the ―Arab feeling of animosity and hostility towards the
Jews consequent upon their disappointment of their political and national aspirations and
fear for their economic future.‖ The British government subsequently released the
Passfield White Paper in October 1930, which proposed to limit Jewish immigration to
Palestine by tying it to Arab economic development. Within a few months, Dr. Chaim
Weizmann, the leading figure of European Zionism, had successfully persuaded British
Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald to withdraw the policy. [H. Sachar, A History of
Israel (3rd ed.) (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2007), 175-8]. Attempts by the British
Mandate authorities to establish legislative institutions in Palestine floundered, with the
Palestinians not wanting to legitimize the Mandate and the Zionists demanding a council
that was based on equal representation of Jews and Palestinians, despite their minority
numbers.

19. With the doors to many Western countries closed, European Jewish immigration to
Palestine intensified in the mid-1930s. The economy prospered, foreign investment
expanded, the cities – particularly Tel Aviv and Haifa – grew significantly, but national
tensions, never far from the surface, also rose. Jewish land purchases had begun to
dislocate significant numbers of Palestinian peasants and farm labourers. In 1936, the
newly-formed Arab Higher Committee, the leading political body among the
Palestinians, launched a general strike, demanding an end to Jewish immigration, a halt
of land sales to Jews, and national independence. In the wake of the general strike,
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Britain established the Peel Commission to investigate the causes of the unrest. The
Report, issued in 1937, acknowledged the contradictory national aspirations of the
Palestinians and the Zionist movement: ―The underlying causes of the disturbances, or
(as we regard it) the rebellion, of 1936 are, first, the desire of the Arabs for national
independence; secondly, their antagonism to the establishment of the Jewish National
Home in Palestine, quickened by the fear of Jewish domination…We have found that,
although the Arabs have benefited by the development of the country owing to Jewish
immigration, this has had no conciliatory effect.‖ [‗Excerpts from the Report of the
Palestine Royal Commission (The Peel Commission), in JN Moore (ed.) The Arab-Israeli
Conflict (Princeton: American Society of International Law, 1974), vol. III, 151].

20. The Peel Report recommended that Britain terminate the Mandate in Palestine as
constituted, partition the country into Jewish and Arab states, with a British Mandate
territory remaining in Jerusalem, Bethlehem, Nazareth, the Sea of Galilee, and a narrow
corridor between Jerusalem and the Mediterranean. As well, it recommended that a
quarter of the Palestinian population and a small percentage of the Jewish population
should be transferred between the two proposed states. The importance of the Peel Report
was its endorsement of the concept of partition for Palestine, the first time that an official
British document had done so. The Zionist movement was divided over Peel‘s two-state
recommendation. Some opposed the idea as a dilution of its ambition of a Jewish state in
all of Palestine, while others, such as David Ben-Gurion, saw the proposal as a pragmatic
and necessary prelude to a larger Jewish state in the future. The Palestinians
overwhelmingly rejected the Peel recommendation in favour of a unitary state with
majority rule, and the general strike became a revolt which continued until the British
army crushed it in 1939. The failure of the 1936-39 revolt left the Palestinians dispirited
and disorganized, with much of their political leadership arrested or exiled.

21. Following the release of the Peel Report, the British government created the
Woodhead Commission to provide advice on how to implement partition. Its report,
issued in 1938, accepted the idea of partition, but with a geographically smaller Jewish
state than that proposed by the Peel Commission. The following year, the British
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government released a White Paper which abandoned partition as a feasible future for
Palestine, and instead called for: ‗a State in which the two peoples in Palestine, Arabs and
Jews, share authority in government in such a way that the essential interests of each are
shared.‘ The White Paper also called for a quota ceiling of 75,000 Jewish refugees into
Palestine over the next five years, with no further Jewish immigration after that without
Arab acquiescence. [‗Palestine Statement of Policy (The MacDonald White Paper), in JN
Moore (ed.) The Arab-Israeli Conflict (Princeton: American Society of International
Law, 1974), vol. III, 211-221]. The leadership of the Zionist movement and the Yishuv
opposed the White Paper, particularly its limitations on Jewish immigration and its
abandonment of a Jewish state. The Palestinian leadership criticized the White Paper‘s
proposal to allow more Jewish immigration as a threat to its national aspirations, and for
not recommending independence for Arab Palestine.

22. The start of the Second World War brought an uneasy truce to Palestine. The Grand
Mufti had fled first to Iraq and later to Berlin, spending most of the war in Germany;
other Palestinian leaders, while opposed to the British Mandate, sought to reach an
accommodation with the British during the war. In May 1942, an extraordinary meeting
of American Zionists in New York, with Ben-Gurion and Weizmann in attendance,
adopted the Biltmore Program, which urged that ―Palestine be established as a Jewish
Commonwealth integrated in the structure of the new democratic world.‖ [‗Declaration
Adopted by the Extraordinary Zionist Conference, Biltmore Hotel, New York, May 11,
1942‘, in JN Moore (ed.) The Arab-Israeli Conflict (Princeton: American Society of
International Law, 1974), vol. III, 231-232]. To defend Palestine against the German
army in North Africa, the British Mandate created Jewish brigades which fought against
the Axis forces in the Levant and Italy; these units acquired the logistical and operational
skills that would later contribute to the Yishuv‘s military prowess during the 1947-9 war.
By 1944, underground militant Jewish groups – notable, the Irgun and Lehi – began a
campaign of sabotage against the British mandatory forces which would intensify over
the next four years.

3 The United Nations, Partition and Conflict (1945-49)
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23. With the war‘s end in 1945, tensions in Palestine rose markedly. Renewed European
Jewish immigration to Palestine, much of it unauthorized, sparked conflict between
Zionism and the British Mandate. Although in a weakened state, the Palestinians sought
an end to the British Mandate and the establishment of a unitary state based on
representative democracy. The Nazi Holocaust had killed six million European Jews and,
with the full revelation of the horror, the political and diplomatic momentum in the West
shifted decisively in favour of a Jewish state in Palestine. As the levels of violence
escalated among the Palestinians, the Jewish Yishuv and the British Mandate army, the
British government announced its desire in early April 1947 to end its Mandate and turn
the problem over to the United Nations.

24. In May 1947, the United Nations General Assembly created the Special Committee
on Palestine (UNSCOP), [UNGA Res 106 (S-1) (15 May 1947)], and its eleven member
commission toured Palestine in the summer of 1947. The UNSCOP report was issued on
3 September 1947, with a majority report recommending partition of the territory into
Jewish and Palestinian Arab states, and a minority report advocating a federal state with
distinct Palestinian and Jewish self-governing institutions. The partition division,
according to the figures in the majority Report, would provide for a Jewish state with
498,000 Jews and 497,000 Palestinians. In the proposed Palestinian state, there would be
725,000 Palestinians and 10,000 Jews. [‗Excerpts from the Report of the United Nations
Special Committee on Palestine‘, in JN Moore (ed.) The Arab-Israeli Conflict (Princeton:
American Society of International Law, 1974), vol. III, 260-311]. Upon receiving the
UNSCOP Report, the United Nations General Assembly constituted an Ad Hoc
Committee on the Palestine Question to frame the debate in plenary session of the UN
membership. The Committee drew up two proposals, one for partition with economic
union between the two areas, and one for a single state of Palestine with separate Jewish
and Arab institutions.

25. On 29 November 1947, the General Assembly adopted the two-state partition
recommendation by the required two-thirds majority vote: 33 in favour, 13 opposed and
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10 abstentions. [‗General Assembly Resolution 181 (II) Concerning the Future
Government of Palestine‘, in JN Moore (ed.) The Arab-Israeli Conflict (Princeton:
American Society of International Law, 1974), vol. III, 314-339.] The UNGA partition
plan proposed to divide Palestine into Jewish and Palestinian states, with an economic
union between them. The two states were to each enact a constitution that would provide
specified guarantees, including minority religious and political rights. Persons could
choose which state they wished to be citizens. Jerusalem would become a corpus
separatum under international trusteeship. The Jewish state would receive approximately
55 percent of Mandate Palestine, while the Palestinian state would acquire about 44
percent. By the end of 1947, Jews constituted approximately one third (610,000) of the
population of Palestine, owned 7 per cent of the land, and were concentrated largely on
the coastal plain, parts of the Galilee and in and around Jerusalem. The Palestinians
numbered approximately 1,230,000, and lived in large numbers throughout Palestine,
although they remained a predominately rural and agrarian population. The international
city of Jerusalem and its environs would have 100,000 Jews and 105,000 Arabs.
Independence would be granted no later than 1 August 1948. [‗Excerpts from the Report
of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine‘, in JN Moore (ed.) The ArabIsraeli Conflict (Princeton: American Society of International Law, 1974), vol. III, 260311].

26. The Jewish Agency, the leading political institution of the Yishuv, accepted
Resolution 181 (although there were prominent Zionist dissenters, including Menachem
Begin, later Prime Minister of Israel). It was rejected by the Grand Mufti Haj al-Husseini
(who remained in exile) and the Arab Higher Committee. The Yishuv was well-armed and
well-organized, and the Palestinians, still plagued by fractious leaders, weak national
institutions and military disarray from the defeat of the 1936-39 Revolt, were neither. Nor
were the neighbouring Arab countries united in their political and military response to the
conflict in Palestine. Fighting broke out between the Jewish and Palestinian communities
in December 1947, and escalated sharply in early 1948. The weak Palestinian leadership
began to crumble, and large numbers of Palestinians were either expelled by the Jewish
militias or fled because of the fighting or fear of civilian massacres. By May 1948,
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approximately 350,000 Palestinians had involuntarily left their homes.

27. Upon the declaration of Israeli independence on 15 May 1948, Arab armies from five
countries entered the fighting. For the next six months, most of the fighting between the
nascent Israeli army and the Arab armies took place within the areas allocated to the
Palestinian state. With superior arms, training and discipline, the Israeli military
decisively defeated the Arab armies. The strongest Arab army, the Jordanian Arab
Legion, fought in the shadow of a tacit agreement between Israel and King Abdullah of
Jordan, who coveted the western part of Palestine. As the war drew to a close in late
1948, Israel had enlarged its area of control through military action from the 55 percent
of Palestine allocated by UNGA 181 to 78 percent. After mid-May 1948, another 380,000
Palestinians were expelled or fled, leaving only 150,000 Palestinians within the enlarged
area now claimed by Israel. The 730,000 Palestinian refugees left homeless (and
subsequently stateless) by the war were sheltered in make-shift tent camps in Lebanon,
Syria, Jordan, the West Bank of the Jordan River and the Gaza strip. Both communities
lost approximately 1% of their populations as causalities of the war. [H. Sachar, A
History of Israel (3rd ed.) (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2007), 279-353; B. Morris, 1948
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008].

28. Israel became a state on 14 May 1948, and was immediately recognized by the United
States and the Soviet Union. In its Declaration of Independence, the country‘s founders
proclaimed Israel as the birthplace of the Jewish people, paid homage to the millions of
European Jews who perished in the Holocaust, and based the legal legitimacy of Israel on
the Balfour Declaration, the 1922 League of Nations Mandate and UNGA Resolution
181. The Declaration stated that Israel was a Jewish state, and guaranteed the ‗complete
equality of social and political rights to all its inhabitants irrespective of religion, race or
sex‘ as well as ‗full and equal citizenship‘ to the Arab inhabitants. [‗Declaration of the
Establishment of the State of Israel, May 14, 1948‘, in JN Moore (ed.) The Arab-Israeli
Conflict (Princeton: American Society of International Law, 1974), vol. III, 349-351].
Israel was subsequently admitted as a member of the United Nations on 11 May 1949,
having declared that it accepted the obligations of the United Nations Charter [UNGA
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Res 273 (III) (11 May 1949)].

29. On 11 December 1948, the United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution
194, which established a Conciliation Commission to supervise the final settlement of all
outstanding questions between Israel and the Palestinians, called for the protection of the
various Holy Places, and requested the Security Council to ensure the demilitarization of
Jerusalem [UNGA Res 194 (III) (11 December 1948)]. Resolution 194 also stated that:
‗the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours
should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date‘, with compensation to be
paid to those not choosing to return home and to those who suffered loss or damage to
their properties.

30. The United Nations sponsored armistice talks between Israel, Jordan, Egypt, Syria
and Lebanon on the Greek island of Rhodes. The ensuing 1949 Armistice agreements did
not result in established borders, but recognized only the lines of demarcation which the
various armies held at the ceasefire. Israel maintained control over the 78 percent of
Palestine that it possessed at the ceasefire. Egypt held Gaza, and Jordan controlled the
West Bank. In 1950, Jordan made a claim of sovereignty over the West Bank, a claim
that was recognized by only two other countries (Britain and Pakistan). Egypt, on the
other hand, acted as the administrator of Gaza in ‗the name of the Palestinian people‘ and
never claimed sovereignty over the territory. Jerusalem became a divided city, with Israel
assuming control over its western sector and Jordan over its eastern sector, including the
Old City. The Palestinians were left without a state, with 60 percent of its population
having become refugees and the remaining 40 percent who had stayed in their homes
now ruled by three different governments: Israel, Jordan and Egypt. Israel encouraged
large-scale Jewish immigration from the European Jewish refugee camps and from the
significant Jewish communities in North Africa and the Middle East to entrench the
demographic transformation: between 1949 and 1952, approximately 700,000 Jews
arrived in Israel to join the 650,000 Israeli Jews already there. Many of the Arab Jews,
particularly those leaving Iraq and Egypt, later had their homes and properties
confiscated. In Israel, they were settled in the emptied Palestinian urban neighbourhoods,

15

while new Israeli kibbutzim and immigrant settlements were established on the
depopulated Palestinian orchards and farms. The small Palestinian population that
remained in Israel after 1948 lived as Israeli citizens, but under special Israeli military
regulations – restricting movement, land use and a range of civil liberties – which
remained in place until 1966.

31. In December 1949, the United Nations created the United Nations Relief and Works
Agency for the Palestinian Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) to provide basic
services – primarily education, housing, social services and health care – to the growing
Palestinian refugee population in the Arab countries sheltering them in special camps.
[‗General Assembly Resolution 302 (IV) Concerning Assistance to Palestinian Refugees,
December 9, 1949‘ in JN Moore (ed.) The Arab-Israeli Conflict (Princeton: American
Society of International Law, 1974), vol. III, 569-573]. UNRWA was funded largely by
donations from western countries, and was intended as a temporary measure until a final
settlement to the conflict was achieved. By virtue of UNRWA‘s specific mandate for the
Palestinians, they were expressly excluded from coverage by the 1951 Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees [(1951) 189 UNTS 150]. Initially, the Palestinian
refugees lived in tents, and gradually moved into more permanent, if very modest,
housing while remaining in refugee camps. UNRWA initiated its operations in Lebanon,
Syria, Jordan and the Gaza Strip in 1950, and has continued its work in these places since
then and, since 1967, in the Israeli-occupied Palestinian territories in the West Bank and
East Jerusalem. [B. Schiff, Refugees Unto the Third Generation: UN Aid to Palestinians
(Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1995)].

32. In January 1949, the new State of Israel held its first Knesset elections based on
proportional representation with a two percent threshold needed to win seats, which
resulted in a plethora of political parties and perennial coalition governments. The
elections were based on a universal electorate, with a voting age of 18. David BenGurion, leader of the Mapai party, became the first prime minister, and Chaim Weizmann
was elected by the Knesset to become Israel‘s first president, a largely ceremonial office.
A draft constitution was debated, but ultimately rejected, and Israel remains today
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without a formal constitution. Many of the pre-state institutions, including the Jewish
Agency, the Jewish National Fund and the Histadrut, maintained their economic and
political importance in the new state.

4. War over Suez (1956)
33. The period between 1949 and 1956 witnessed a number of clashes on the armistice
borders between Israel and its Arab neighbours. Some of the skirmishes were between
armies, particularly along the Sea of Galilee and the demilitarized zone between Israel
and Syria. Other clashes arose from the crossing of the Israeli frontier by exiled
Palestinians, some armed and seeking revenge, others unarmed and wanting to visit
family or harvest crops on their former lands. The Israeli military regularly responded
with commando raids into Gaza and the West Bank. One raid in October 1953 on the
Jordanian West Bank village of Qibya resulted in the deaths of approximately 65
Palestinian civilians, drawing the opprobrium of the UN Security Council [UNSC Res
101 (24 November 1953) UN Doc S/RES/101]. Tensions between Israel and Egypt grew
with the rise to power of Gamal Abdel Nasser and the tightening of the Egyptian
blockade of Israeli shipping in the Straits of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba. As well,
Egypt‘s decision to buy Soviet arms via Czechoslovakia in 1955, its support of the
Algerian rebellion against French colonial rule, and the American decision to block a
World Bank loan to fund the Aswan dam on the Nile chilled the relations between the
West and the Nasser regime.
34. Egyptian President Nasser‘s nationalization of the Suez Canal in July 1956
precipitated the decision by Britain, France and Israel – secured through the secret
Protocol of Sèvres in October 1956 – to launch a massive co-ordinated attack on Egypt.
Britain hoped to install a more Western-friendly government and regain control of the
Canal; France aimed at crippling Egypt‘s aid to the Algerian uprising; and Israel wanted
to curb Arab nationalism, as personified by Nasser, and to punish Egypt for its tacit
support of Palestinian guerrilla (fedayeen) raids from Gaza. Israel‘s initial attack on 29
October 1956 quickly captured the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip from Egypt.
Several days later, British and French aerial attacks destroyed the Egyptian air force. On
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5 November 1956, Britain and France invaded Egypt under the pretext of separating the
warring armies, with Britain capturing Port Said and marching towards Suez City. Both
the United States and the Soviet Union demanded an immediate ceasefire and the
withdrawal of foreign troops from Egyptian soil. Britain and France withdrew within a
week. The United Nations General Assembly, under its Uniting for Peace powers,
adopted a resolution establishing the UN Emergency Force to act as peacekeepers in the
Sinai Peninsula. [UNGA Res. 1001 (XII) (7 November 1956)]. Israel subsequently
withdrew from the Sinai and Gaza in early 1957 upon the arrival of the UN peacekeeping
troops. [H. Sachar, A History of Israel (3rd ed.) (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2007), 472514].

5. The Creation of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (1964)

35. Scattered widely around the Arab world after the Nakba (catastrophe) of 1947-9, the
Palestinians remained in a prolonged political paralysis, without effective leaders or an
independent national voice. Between 1949 and 1964, small guerrilla raids into Israel from
Gaza, Syria and the West Bank amounted to only insignificant military irritants for the
Israeli Defence Forces. But with the emergence of pan-Arab nationalism in the 1950s, the
Palestinians in the refugee camps, in Arab universities and in the oil fields of the Arabian
Gulf began to organize intensively. The Palestinian National Charter was issued in 1964
at a meeting of the Arab League. It created a new organization, the Palestinian Liberation
Organization (PLO), which proclaimed the right to self-determination, called for armed
struggle to liberate Palestine and declared Zionism a colonial and expansionist
movement. [‗The Palestinian National Charter of 1964‘, in JN Moore (ed.) The ArabIsraeli Conflict (Princeton: American Society of International Law, 1974), vol. III, 699704]. After the massive Arab military losses in the June 1967 war, the emergent
Palestinian resistance organizations, led by Fatah and its leader Yasser Arafat, gained
control of the PLO from the Arab League and initiated their independent quest for a
Palestinian state.

6. The June War of 1967
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36. Tensions between Israel and its Arab neighbours rose dramatically in 1966 and early
1967. The contributing factors included Palestinian guerrilla raids into Israel from Jordan
and Syria, a massive retaliation by the Israeli military into the Jordanian West Bank in
November 1966, and regular skirmishes on the Israeli-Syrian demilitarized zone which
culminated in the shooting down of six Syrian fighter jets in April 1967.

37. In May of 1967, the United Nations peacekeeping force– the United Nations
Emergency Force – was withdrawn from the Sinai Peninsula on Egypt‘s demand.
President Nasser followed up by moving several Egyptian army divisions into the Sinai
in order to relieve the Israeli pressure on Syria. A bellicose atmosphere quickly escalated,
and Egypt closed the Gulf of Aqaba and the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping. President
Nasser threatened to destroy Israel, although Israeli military leaders doubted Egypt‘s
intentions and military strength (‗I do not think Nasser wanted war. The two divisions he
sent to the Sinai in May would not have been sufficient to launch an offensive against
Israel. He knew it and we knew it.‘ Chief of Staff of the Israeli Army General Yitzhak
Rabin, quoted in Le Monde 29 February 1968). On 5 June, Israel attacked the Egyptian,
Syrian and Jordanian air forces, destroying all three. It then invaded and captured the
Sinai and Gaza. Following clashes initiated by the Jordanian army in support of Egypt,
the Israeli army took East Jerusalem and the West Bank. On 9 June, Israel attacked and
occupied the Syrian Golan Heights. A cease-fire was finally accepted by all parties on 10
June. [A. Lall The UN and the Middle East Crisis, 1967 (Columbia University Press New
York 1968)]. With the military victory, over one million Arabs, primarily Palestinians,
came under Israel‘s rule. Approximately 300,000 Palestinians from the West Bank and
East Jerusalem were expelled or fled from their homes and crossed into Jordan.
Approximately 100,000 Syrians living on the Golan Heights fled the fighting and became
refugees as well. Syria, Egypt and Jordan suffered 4,300 military dead, while Israel lost
almost 1,000 soldiers in combat.

38. Following the June war, the United Nations became the diplomatic focus for the
international community‘s supervision of the conflict. Besides seeking to terminate the
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hostilities and ensure respect for international humanitarian law, a number of United
Nations members sought two larger political goals arising out of the war: the end to
Israel‘s belligerent occupation of the newly conquered lands, and the creation of a
principled political and legal framework for a lasting peace in the Middle East. After five
months of negotiations and debates at the United Nations during the summer and autumn
of 1967, the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 242 on 22 November
1967. [UNSC Res 242 (22 November 1967) UN Doc S/RES/242]. It called for
‗[w]ithdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict,‘ and
‗termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement
of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the
area.‘ The Resolution has come to be accepted as the legal and political foundation for
Arab-Israeli peace negotiations. [S. Bailey, The Making of Resolution 242 (Dordrecht:
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1985)].

39. Shortly after the end of the June 1967 war, Israel began to stake claims for some of
the newly-conquered territories. On 27 June 1967, the Israeli Cabinet and Knesset voted
for the ‗municipal fusion‘ of Jerusalem by annexing East Jerusalem and some of the
surrounding West Bank. The United Nations General Assembly immediately declared
that the measures were invalid. [UNGA Res 2253 (XXII) (4 July 1967); UNGA Res 2254
(XXII) (14 July 1967)]. The Israeli Cabinet began approving projects during the summer
of 1967 to populate East Jerusalem, the West Bank and the Golan Heights with Jewish
civilian settlements, initially under the guise of military facilities. [H. Sachar, A History
of Israel (3rd ed.) (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2007), 667-713; G. Gorenberg, The
Accidental Empire (New York: Times Books, 2006)].

7. The October 1973 War

40. Intensive diplomacy by the international community between 1967 and 1973
accomplished little to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict, to reach a peace agreement or
even to create any substantive trust among the belligerent parties. Egypt and Israel fought
a War of Attrition along the Suez Canal. Cold War rivalries heightened, as the Soviet
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Union expanded its relationships with Egypt and Syria, and the alliance between the
United States and Israel deepened. A growing rift between the PLO forces in Jordan and
King Hussein, followed by a series of airplane hijackings in September 1970, resulted in
a short civil war and the expulsion of the PLO from the Hashemite Kingdom and its relocation to Lebanon. Gamal Nasser mediated an end to the Jordan-PLO war, and then
died of a heart attack; he was succeeded as Egyptian president by Anwar Sadat. In 1972,
Egypt expelled 15,000 Soviet military advisors, which contributed to building Israeli
confidence that the Arab states lacked the ability to wage another large war. In August
1973, Israel released the Galili Document, announcing the country‘s intention to expand
its settlement policies on the lands captured in 1967. Peace plans proposed by the United
States (the Rogers‘ Initiative, named after Secretary of State William Rogers) and the
international community through the United Nations (the Jarring Mission, after the
Swedish envoy Gunnar Janning) gained little traction. Presidents Sadat of Egypt and
Assad of Syria concluded that only another war would puncture Israel‘s self-confidence
and crack the stalemate.

41. Egypt and Syria attacked the Israeli army positions in the Sinai Peninsula and the
Golan Heights on 6 October 1973 in a conflict variously called the October War, the
Ramadan War and the Yom Kippur War. The Arab objective appears to have been
limited to regaining some of their lost territory and pushing the West to re-engage in
serious peace mediation. The surprise attack gave the Arab armies an initial military
advantage, but Israel, with creative military tactics, the emergency delivery of American
weapons and the Arab unwillingness to sustain their offensive, was able to launch a
significant counterattack. On 22 October, the UNSC passed Resolution 338, which called
for a ceasefire and the immediate implementation of UNSC Resolution 242. [UNSC Res
338 (22 October 1973) UN Doc S/RES/338]. UNSC Resolution 340, adopted three days
later, established the Second United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF II) to stand
between the warring parties. [UNSC Res 340 (25 October 1973) UN Doc S/RES/340].
Approximately 2,800 Israeli soldiers were killed, while the Syrians and Egyptians
suffered 8,500 military dead.
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42. The immediate result of the October war was a military draw. Egypt regained some of
its territory in the Sinai and Syria took back parts of the Golan Heights, while Israel
crossed to the west of the Suez Canal and occupied territory close to Cairo. Jordan and
Lebanon did not participate in the war, and the Palestinian territories remained under
Israeli occupation. In the aftermath of the war, the Arab petroleum countries initiated an
oil boycott of select Western countries, shaking the West‘s economy and burying its
complacency about containing the spillover from the Arab-Israeli conflict. In Israel,
Prime Minister Golda Meir became a political casualty of the war, forced to resign in
April 1974 because of the Israeli government‘s perceived unpreparedness for the
Egyptian-Syrian attack. [H. Sachar, A History of Israel (3rd ed.) (New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, 2007), 740-787].

43. The United Nations convened an international conference on the Middle East late in
1973, seeking ways to implement Resolution 242 and to establish a just and lasting peace.
In 1974, Egypt and Syria signed separate disengagement agreements with Israel, giving
the two Arab countries modest territorial recoveries in the Sinai and the Golan. In
October 1974, the Arab League declared the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of
the Palestinian people. The following month, Yasser Arafat, chairman of the PLO,
addressed the United Nations General Assembly. To counter this new-found legitimacy
of the Palestinians, Israel intensified its covert negotiations with King Hussein of Jordan,
seeking to create an Israeli-Jordanian condominium for the West Bank, but these talks
floundered. Meanwhile, a second Egyptian-Israeli disengagement agreement in
September 1975, negotiated under American auspices, produced further land transfers in
the Sinai back to Egypt. [‗Sinai Agreement between Egypt and Israel‘, September 1,
1975‘, in JN Moore (ed.) The Arab-Israeli Conflict (Princeton: American Society of
International Law, 1991), vol. IV, 5-12]. In Israel, the Likud party led by Menachem
Begin won the May 1977 elections over the Labor Alignment, which had governed Israel
continuously since 1948. In power, Begin and the Likud ruled with a distinct right-wing
ideology, and intensified the growth of the Jewish settlements in the occupied territories.

8. Camp David and the Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel (1978-79)
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44. In a surprise initiative, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat flew to Jerusalem and
addressed the Israeli Knesset in November 1977. Ten months of difficult bargaining
followed, culminating in 12 days of summit negotiations at Camp David, in Maryland,
between President Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Begin, mediated by American
President Jimmy Carter. The result was the Camp David Accords of 17 September 1978.
[‗A Framework for Peace in the Middle East Agreed at Camp David‘ (Egypt-Israel)
(agreed 17 September 1978) (1978) 17 ILM 1466]. Subsequently, on 26 March 1979
Egypt became the first Arab country to sign a peace agreement with Israel. [Treaty of
Peace Between the Arab Republic of Egypt and the State of Israel (signed 26 March
1979, entered into force 25 April 1979) 1136 UNTS 116]. The 1979 Peace Treaty
affirmed Resolutions 242 and 338 as the basis for peace in the region, with the following
key points of agreement: 1) the termination of the state of war between Israel and Egypt;
2) a complete Israeli withdrawal of all military forces and civilians from the Egyptian
Sinai; 3) full recognition of each other‘s rights, including the termination of economic
boycotts; 4) free passage of Israeli shipping through the Suez Canal, the Strait of Tiran
and the Gulf of Aqaba; 5) maintenance of the UN forces in a buffer zone; and 6)
establishment of a financial claims commission. Diplomatic relations between Israel and
Egypt followed, and Israel withdrew completely from the Sinai in 1982. Upon the signing
of the Peace Treaty, Egypt was expelled from the Arab League. Anwar Sadat and
Menachem Begin jointly won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1978 for their diplomacy.
President Sadat was subsequently assassinated by Islamic fundamentalists in October
1981, in part for signing a peace treaty with Israel.

45. As part of the Peace Treaty, a joint letter from President Sadat and Prime Minister
Begin to President Carter dated 26 March 1979 committed the parties to initiate
negotiations on autonomy for the West Bank and Gaza. The letter aimed at ‗the
establishment of the self-governing authority in the West Bank and Gaza in order to
provide full autonomy to the inhabitants‘ within a five year transitional period, together
with the end of Israeli military government. [‗Joint Letter Concerning the EgyptianIsraeli Peace Treaty to President Carter from President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin‘,
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in JN Moore (ed.) The Arab-Israeli Conflict (Princeton: American Society of
International Law, 1974), vol. IV, 381-382]. Prime Minister Begin took a strict
interpretation of this commitment, maintaining that it did not impair Israel‘s right to
claim sovereignty over the occupied Palestinian territories after the completion of the five
year transitional period. The subsequent negotiations between Egypt and Israel over the
future of the occupied territories, without Palestinian involvement, failed to reach any
agreement regarding the future of the Palestinian territories or even the end of the
occupation. The Palestine National Congress, meeting in Damascus in January 1979,
adopted a programme denouncing the Camp David process ―as a grave threat to the cause
of Palestine and of Arab national liberation.‖ [‗Political and Organizational Programme
Approved by the Palestine National Council at its Fourteenth Session‘, in JN Moore (ed.)
The Arab-Israeli Conflict (Princeton: American Society of International Law, 1974), vol.
IV, 339-343].

9. The War in Lebanon (1975-90)
46. In April 1975, the multiple schisms in Lebanon – confessional, class, ideological and
economic – erupted into an all-encompassing civil war. The primary causes of the civil
war included the tensions between the Maronite militias and the Muslim and Druze
communities; the maldistribution of wealth; the arrival of the PLO and the discontent of
the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon against the Lebanese government; a weak central
government; and the regular interference in Lebanon‘s affairs by its neighbours. For the
first year of the war, the left-wing, Muslim and PLO military alliance held the upper hand
against the various right-wing Maronite militias. Syria then intervened on the side of the
Maronites in 1976 with American and Israeli consent. The Syrian military presence was
enough to shift the balance of power, but not to end the conflict. Israel supported the
Maronite-led militias, and Iran, Iraq and Syria all supplied various confessional and
political militias with arms and finances. The initial years of the civil war marked the
political rise of the Lebanese Shiites, who were the country‘s largest and the most
impoverished community; its leading militias – Amal, Hezbollah and Islamic Jihad –
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received support from Iran and Syria. [W. Khalidi, Conflict and Violence in Lebanon
(Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1983].

47. In March 1978, a terrorist attack on an Israeli bus north of Tel Aviv carried out by
Palestinian guerrillas from Lebanon resulted in approximately 35 Israeli civilian deaths.
Israel immediately launched ‗Operation Litani‘, a major military attack into southern
Lebanon to destroy guerrilla bases. The UNSC passed Resolution 425, calling for an
Israeli military withdrawal ‗forthwith‘ from Lebanon, and establishing the United
Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) [UNSC Res 425 (19 March 1978) UN Doc
S/RES/425]. Although UNIFIL operated in southern Lebanon with 3,000 international
troops, it was unable to halt Palestinian incursions into Israel or Israel military raids into
Lebanon.

48. In December 1981, the Israeli Knesset legislatively annexed the Golan Heights. This
had many repercussions. Politically, it strained Israel‘s relations with the new Reagan
administration in the United States, which suspended a pending arms sale agreement. The
annexation also caused an uproar in the Arab world, which further isolated Egypt.
Diplomatically, the United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution
497, proclaiming that ‗the Israeli decision to impose its laws, jurisdiction and
administration in the occupied Syrian Golan Heights is null and void and without
international legal effect‘. [UNSC Res 497 (17 December 1981) UN Doc S/RES/497].

49. On 3 June 1982, a renegade Palestinian faction hostile to the PLO shot and seriously
wounded the Israeli ambassador to Britain. Within several days, Israel launched
‗Operation Peace for Galilee,‘ a massive and well-planned invasion of Lebanon with two
principal goals: the destruction of the PLO presence in Lebanon and support for the
ascension of Bashir Gemayel, a Maronite warlord, to the presidency of Lebanon. The
Israeli military quickly occupied all of southern Lebanon, and by 13 June had imposed a
siege on Beirut. The Israeli air force destroyed all Syrian missile bases in the Beka‘a
Valley and shot down 96 Syrian war planes, effectively removing Syria from the conflict.
The UN Security Council passed Resolution 508 on the day of the invasion, demanding
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an immediate ceasefire. [UNSC Res 508 (5 June 1982) UN Doc S/RES/508]. The
following day, UNSC Resolution 509 was adopted, requiring the withdrawal of all Israeli
forces from Lebanon. [UNSC Res 509 (6 June 1982) UN Doc S/RES/509]. The language
of these two resolutions incorporated the UN consensus for ending the conflict:
withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon, respect for the territorial integrity and
sovereignty of Lebanon within its internationally recognized borders, and respect for the
rights of the civilian population. Notwithstanding, Israel continued its military occupation
of southern Lebanon and initiated a bombardment of West Beirut for the next several
months, where a large Lebanese and Palestinian civilian population was effectively
trapped. From June to August 1982, the Security Council continued to adopt resolutions
demanding a ceasefire, without effect. [UNSC Res 518 (12 August 1982) UN Doc
S/RES/518; UNSC Res 517 (4 August 1982) UN Doc S/RES/517; UNSC Res 516 (1
August 1982) UN Doc S/RES/516; UNSC Res 515 (29 July 1982) UN Doc S/RES/515;
UNSC Res 513 (4 July 1982) UN Doc S/RES/513; UNSC Res 512 (19 June 1982) UN
Doc S/RES/512; UNSC Res 511 (18 June 1982) UN Doc S/RES/511]. An estimated
18,000 Lebanese and Palestinians in Lebanon, primarily civilians, were killed during the
Israeli invasion.

50. With United States diplomatic intervention, a ceasefire was put in place on 12 August
1982. The PLO implemented the Habib Agreement (named after the American envoy
Philip Habib), which called for the evacuation of PLO fighters from Lebanon to Tunisia
and other Arab states, and a multinational force to supervise their departure. By 9
September, the PLO evacuation was concluded, and the multinational supervisory force
left Beirut shortly afterwards. Less than a week later, Lebanese president-elect Bashir
Gemayel was assassinated, likely by Syrian agents. Israeli forces moved into West Beirut
and took control of the city. As later concluded by the 1983 Kahan Commission report
(created by Israel to investigate the Sabra and Shatila massacre), the Israeli Defence
Forces under Defence Minister Ariel Sharon were responsible for allowing Lebanese
Maronite Phalangist militias into the Sabra and Shatila refugee camp in Beirut where a
large Palestinian civilian refugee population remained after PLO fighters had withdrawn.
For 40 hours between 16 and 18 September 1982, with the Israeli forces encircling and
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monitoring the camp, the Phalangist militias massacred between 800 and 3,500 civilians.
[‗Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Events at the Refugee Camps in Beirut
(Kahan Report), February 8, 1983‘ in MC Bassiouni (ed) Documents on the Arab-Israeli
Conflict (Aidsley, NY: Transnational Publishers, 2005) vol 1, 702]. The Security Council
adopted Resolution 521, condemning the ‗criminal massacre of Palestinian civilians in
Beirut‘ without assigning responsibility [UNSC Res 521 (19 September 1982) UN Doc
S/RES/521]. Following the release of the Kahan Report, Sharon was forced to resign as
Defence Minister, and Prime Minister Begin was politically weakened.

51. By June of 1985, Israel had pulled most of its troops out of central Lebanon, but
continued to occupy a self-proclaimed ‗security zone‘ in South Lebanon, with the support
of the Israeli-funded South Lebanese Army (SLA). The Lebanese civil war eventually
came in an end in 1990, with a political agreement mediated by the Saudis which resulted
in alterations, but no overhaul, of the Lebanese political structure. Over the fifteen years
of the war, an estimated 150,000 Lebanese and Palestinians, primarily civilians, had been
killed. Lebanon then began a slow political and economic reconstruction, impeded by the
presence of the Syrian army in the centre and north of the country, and the Israeli army in
the south. Hezbollah, a Shiite Lebanese political party and militia, undertook increasingly
effective guerrilla operations against the Israeli army and the SLA in southern Lebanon
through the 1990s. Israel eventually ended its military occupation in 2000. The Syrian
military involuntarily withdrew in 2005, following strong international pressure after the
assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Harari. On 7 April 2005, the UN
Security Council adopted Resolution 1595, which created an international independent
investigation commission to investigate the Harari murder on behalf of Lebanon and the
international community [UNSC Res 1595 (7 April 2005) UN Doc S/RES/1595].

10. Arab Peace Plan (1982)

52. On 9 September 1982, the Twelfth Arab Summit Conference released the Fez Arab
Peace Plan. The Plan adopted a series of principles for an end to the Arab-Israeli conflict
and for a lasting peace in the Middle East. The principles included: (1) Israel‘s
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withdrawal from all the Arab territories captured in the June 1967 war; (2) the
dismantling of all Israeli settlements; (3) a guarantee of freedom of worship in the Holy
Places; (4) an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza, with Jerusalem
as its capital; (5) the right of the Palestinians to all of their national rights under the
leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organization; (6) regional peace; and (7) the
guarantee of these principles by the Security Council. [‗Excerpts from the Final
Declaration of the Twelfth Arab Summit Conference, Fez (Fez Arab Peace Plan)‘ in MC
Bassiouni (ed) Documents on the Arab-Israeli Conflict (Aidsley, NY: Transnational
Publishers, Inc, 2005) vol 2, 863-4].

11 Intifada I (1988-93)

53. The first Palestinian intifada, or uprising, precipitated by an Israeli army vehicle
killing four Palestinian workers in a truck crash in Gaza on 8 December 1987, quickly
spiralled into widespread demonstrations throughout the occupied territories. The
spontaneous uprising led to six years of massive civil resistance, protests, economic
boycotts, tax withholding and strikes aimed at ending the Israeli occupation and bringing
about independence for the Palestinians. The uprising intensified in July 1988 when the
Israeli government authorized of the building of a tunnel adjacent to the Dome of the
Rock in Jerusalem, the Haram al-Sharif, Islam‘s third holiest site. The first intifada was
led by a new and well-organized generation of Palestinians who grew up under Israeli
occupation; they were sympathetic to the PLO, but not led directly by its exiled
leadership in Tunisia.

54. The Israeli political and military leadership was caught off-guard by the intifada.
Their response to the intifada was ‗Operation Iron Fist:‘ using live ammunition against
demonstrators; imposing collective punishment on towns and villages through curfews
and home demolitions; and the imprisonment of participants and the deportations of the
intifada’s leaders. An estimated 1,100 Palestinians and 160 Israelis were killed during the
first intifada. As well, approximately 80,000 Palestinians were imprisoned. Both the UN
Security Council and General Assembly adopted resolutions concerning the intifada,
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which variously confirmed the applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention to the
occupied territories and East Jerusalem, deplored Israeli practices in responding to the
uprising, and re-asserted the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force:
[UNSC Res 681 (20 December 1990) UN Doc S/RES/681; UNGA Res 46/82 (19
December 1991) UN Doc A/RES/46/82; UNSC Res 672 (12 October 1990) UN Doc
S/RES/672; UNSC Res 607 (5 January 1988) UN Doc S/RES/607; UNSC Res 605 (22
December 1987) UN Doc S/RES/605]. One significant offshoot of the first intifada was
the founding of Hamas (―the Islamic Resistance Movement‖) in Gaza as a Palestinian
Islamist political and military organization; it was formed in response to the perceived
failure of secular Palestinian political movements to end the Israeli occupation and
achieve an independent state.

55. On 31 July 1988, King Hussein announced that Jordan was withdrawing all
administrative and legal claims to the West Bank. [‗His Majesty King Hussein of
Jordan‘s Address to the Nation Concerning Disengagement from the West Bank‘, in MC
Bassiouni (ed) Documents on the Arab-Israeli Conflict (Aidsley, NY: Transnational
Publishers, Inc, 2005) vol 2, 586-590]. In November of that year, the PLO conference in
Algiers accepted the legitimacy of Israel, endorsed all relevant UN resolutions on the
Middle East, renounced terrorism, and called for a two-state solution to the conflict.
[Palestine Liberation Organization ‗Declaration of Palestinian Independence Issued by
the Palestine Liberation Organization, November 15, 1988 (Algiers Declaration)‘ in MC
Bassiouni (ed) Documents on the Arab-Israeli Conflict (Transnational Publishers Inc
Aidsley New York 2005) vol 2, 590-593]. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990,
and the subsequent military ejection of Iraqi forces by the US-led international coalition
in February 1991 led indirectly to renewed diplomacy to address the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict. At the time of the Iraq invasion, the PLO leadership had sided with Iraqi dictator
Saddam Hussein, resulting in the PLO‘s diplomatic isolation after Iraq was expelled from
Kuwait. In October 1991, the US and the USSR issued a joint invitation to Israel and
many Arab countries to a peace conference in Madrid. Neither the Palestinians nor the
PLO were specifically invited to Madrid, although Palestinian representatives from
within the occupied territories were included as part of the Jordanian delegation with the
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PLO‘s blessing. A notable outcome of the Madrid meeting was the establishment of five
multilateral working groups on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, addressing the outstanding
issues of arms control and regional security, the environment, water, regional economic
development and the refugees.

56. In 1990, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir and his Likud-led government
embarked upon a significant expansion of Israeli settlements in the occupied territories,
both to satisfy the territorial aspirations of his right-wing political partners in government
and to house the significant influx of Jewish immigrants from the collapsing Soviet
Union. The settlement policy provoked a showdown with President George H.W. Bush of
the United States, who blocked a $10 billion (US) loan to Israel in February 1992. The
Jewish civilian settlement project in the occupied territories had been supported by every
Israeli government since 1967, and had grown from approximately 10,000 settlers in
1972 to 107,000 settlers in 1983 to 228,000 settlers by 1990. The American loan was
subsequently unfrozen after the election victory of Yitzhak Rabin and his Labor
alignment party in June 1992 and his commitment to freeze ‗political settlements‘ in the
occupied territories. While the Madrid process produced little progress during the Shamir
government, the pace quickened after the election of Rabin. Parallel secret negotiations
between semi-official Palestinian and Israeli representatives in Oslo under the auspices of
the Norwegians were initiated, beginning in December 1992. These negotiations
culminated in a tentative agreement in August 1993.

12 Oslo Accords (1993)

57. The secret Oslo negotiations brought about the Declaration of Principles on Interim
Self-Government Arrangements of 13 September 1993 (‗DOP‘), signed on the White
House lawn by Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat in
the presence of American President Bill Clinton. [‗Declaration of Principles on Interim
Self-Government Arrangements between Israel and the Palestinian Liberation
Organization‘, in MC Bassiouni (ed ) Documents on the Arab-Israeli Conflict
(Transnational Publishers Inc Aidsley New York 2005) vol 2, 890-897]. The DOP
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enabled the establishment of the Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority in parts
of the occupied territories, and Israel recognized the PLO as the legitimate representative
of the Palestinians. In turn, the PLO recognized the State of Israel and renounced
violence. Israel agreed to withdraw its military forces from parts of the West Bank and
Gaza. As well, the DOP and its accompanying documents addressed the issues of
Palestinian elections, economic co-operation, and interim security arrangements. The
Oslo Accords also set out a transitional five year process for negotiating a final peace
accord between Israel and the Palestinians, within the framework of United Nations
Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, but they did not otherwise require that
international law and the considerable body of UN resolutions on the conflict would be
the terms of reference for the eventual peace agreement. The Accords left the most
difficult ‗final status‘ issues – including Jerusalem, the settlements, water, borders,
security and the Palestinian refugees – to be negotiated at the end of the process. Neither
the DOP nor any of the subsequent documents called explicitly for a Palestinian state to
be established at the end of the process. Prime Minister Rabin, Foreign Minister Peres
and Chairman Arafat won the 1994 Nobel Peace Prize for their role in creating the DOP.

58. The 1993 DOP was followed by a series of subsequent agreements on various
transitional issues between Israel and the PLO, reached under the diplomatic supervision
of the United States. These agreements included: the Protocol on Economic Relations
between the Government of Israel and the PLO of April 1994; the Agreement on the
Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area between Israel and the PLO of May 1994; the Agreement
on Preparatory Transfer of Powers and Responsibility between Israel and the PLO of
August1994; the Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip between Israel and
the PLO of September 1995; the Agreement on Temporary International Presence in the
City of Hebron between Israel and the PLO of May 1996 (‗TIPH‘), and the Protocol
Concerning Redeployment in Hebron between Israel and the PLO of January 1997. [All
are found in: MC Bassiouni (ed) Documents on the Arab-Israeli Conflict (Transnational
Publishers Inc Aidsley New York 2005) vol. 2].
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59. The principal territorial feature of the Oslo process was the creation of three zones of
control in the occupied Palestinian territories for the interim period: Area ‗A‘, consisting
of the heavily-populated Palestinian cities and towns, would be under the full political
and security control of the Palestinian Authority; Area ‗B‘, consisting of smaller
Palestinian communities and rural areas, would be governed by Palestinian civil control
and Israel security control; and Area ‗C‘, consisting of the Israeli settlements and territory
adjacent to the pre-1967 Israeli border would be entirely controlled by Israeli security.
The result was a series of non-contiguous islands of Palestinian-ruled land – Area ‗A‘ –
enclosed by larger areas under Israeli security rule, with the Palestinians required to pass
through a multitude of Israeli checkpoints to move from one island of PA control to
another. As well, Israel‘s military law, with its 2,000 military orders enacted since 1967,
remained the principal legal framework for governing the Palestinian territories. Under
the interim agreements, East Jerusalem would continue to be under full Israeli control.
The West Bank and Gaza were to be viewed as a single territorial unit for the purposes of
a future Palestinian self-governing entity.

60. In November 1995, a Jewish right-wing militant assassinated Prime Minister Yitzhak
Rabin, removing Israel‘s most credible supporter of the Oslo process from the country‘s
political scene. He was succeeded by Shimon Peres, who narrowly lost the subsequent
national elections to Benyamin Netanyahu of the Likud Party in May 1996. In January
1996, Palestinians held presidential and legislative elections, which were won by Yasser
Arafat and his Fatah organization. In April 1996, a short intensive conflict broke out
between Hezbollah and Israel – ‗Operation Grapes of Wrath‘ – which killed several
hundred Lebanese civilians, including 100 civilians hit by Israeli shelling who had sought
shelter at a UN compound in Qana, southern Lebanon. The UN Security Council adopted
Resolution 1052, calling for an immediate cessation of hostilities and respect for the
territorial integrity of Lebanon [UNSC Res 1052 (18 April 1996) UN Doc S/RES/1052].

61. In 1997, the Netanyahu government decided not to hand over further territory to the
Palestinian Authority that was required by the Oslo agreements. As a consequence,
negotiations on the ‗final status‘ issues that were to begin in 1996 made no meaningful
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progress. Meetings between Israel and the Palestinian Authority late in the life of the
Netanyahu government, pushed by the Clinton administration, resulted in the Wye River
Memorandum in October 1998 [Wye River Memorandum (Interim Agreement) (IsraelPalestine Liberation Organization) (signed 23 October 1998) (1998) 37 ILM 1251],
which set out a timeline for phased Israeli redeployments and additional security
arrangements, including the establishment of a Palestinian police force. The timeline
established that ‗final status‘ negotiations were to start as soon as the Memorandum
entered into force. The Wye Memorandum was suspended two months later by Prime
Minister Netanyahu, and his government fell shortly afterwards following a vote of noconfidence in the Knesset. In the national elections of May 1999, Ehud Barak and the
Labor Party were voted into office on a platform of resuscitating the Oslo process.

13 Peace Treaty between Jordan and Israel (1994)

62. On 26 October 1994, Israel and Jordan entered into a Treaty of Peace at Wadi Araba,
signed by Prime Ministers Yitzhak Rabin and Abdul Salem Majali, and witnessed by
American President Bill Clinton [Treaty of Peace Between the State of Israel and the
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (adopted 26 October 1994, entered into force 10
November 1994) 2042 UNTS 393]. The treaty established a framework for political,
economic, cultural cooperation and the basis for permanent peace between the two states
based on UNSC Resolutions 242 and 338. King Hussein of Jordan had conducted
numerous secret meetings with a succession of Israeli governments since the 1960s to
stabilize the border between the counties and, after 1967, to advance Jordan‘s claim for
the return of the West Bank. The Treaty pledged that the two countries would ‗develop
good neighbourly relations of co-operation between them to ensure lasting security, will
refrain from the threat or use of force against each other and will settle all disputes
between them by peaceful means‘. [A. Shlaim, Lion of Jordan: The Life of King Hussein
in War and Peace (New York: Penguin, 2008].

14 Subsequent Peace Talks: Camp David II
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63. Following the election of the Barak government in Israel in May 1999, the faltering
Oslo process acquired a new sense of optimism. Prime Minister Barak and President
Arafat met in Egypt in September, and agreed to the Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum
[―Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum, September 4, 1999‖ in MC Bassiouni (ed) Documents
on the Arab-Israeli Conflict (Transnational Publishers Inc Aidsley New York 2005) vol
2, 1149-52]. It provided for three small Israeli military withdrawals from the West Bank,
the release of some Palestinian prisoners, and the start of intensive negotiations towards a
final status peace agreement.

64. While the Israelis and Palestinians prepared for final status talks, Israel and Syria
engaged in intensive negotiations in late 1999 and early 2000 for the return of the Golan
Heights to Syria. Conducted primarily through American interlocutors, a draft peace
agreement was achieved, but the negotiations eventually floundered in March 2000. A
key unresolved issue was whether the final border between the two countries would be
based on the 1923 Mandate line with all of Lake Tiberias (also known as the Sea of
Galilee) within Israel, or the 1949 armistice line with Syria possessing the eastern edge of
the Lake.

65. After the failure of the Syrian track, President Clinton hosted Prime Minister Barak
and President Arafat at a summit in July 2000 at the American presidential retreat at
Camp David. The three leaders met for two weeks of intensive negotiations in an attempt
to reach a final and durable peace agreement. The Camp David II summit failed to
achieve a final agreement, with the parties at some distance from each other, primarily
due to differences over final borders, the ultimate status of Jerusalem, and the fate of the
Palestinian refugees. The parties reached an understanding on some basic principles,
including the centrality of resolutions 242 and 338 as the framework for peace, which
were incorporated into a Trilateral Statement on the ME Peace Summit (‗Camp David
II‘). [--‗Trilateral Statement on the Middle East Peace Summit‘ in MC Bassiouni (ed)
Documents on the Arab-Israeli Conflict (Transnational Publishers, Inc Aidsley New York
2005) vol 2, 1159].
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66. In December 2000, the parties were brought back to the White House to make one
final effort to reach an agreement based on the ‗Clinton Parameters‘. [‗Clinton
Parameters to Palestinian and Israeli Negotiators (December 23, 2000)‘ in MC Bassiouni
(ed) Documents on the Arab-Israeli Conflict (Transnational Publishers, Inc Aidsley New
York 2005) vol 2, 1160]. These parameters called for a return of much of the West Bank
and Gaza to the Palestinians, Israeli retention of its principal settlement blocs, Israeli
territorial compensation to the Palestinians for some of these retained lands, the
demilitarization of the new Palestinian state, a division of Jerusalem according to
demography, a form of joint sovereignty over the Old City, and the acceptance of some
Palestinian refugees to settle in the nascent Palestinian state. Both sides accepted the
parameters, although with separate reservations. The Clinton Parameters became the
framework for subsequent talks at Taba, Egypt in late January 2001, where further
progress towards narrowing the differences was made, but, once again, the issues of
borders, Jerusalem and refugees bedevilled the achievement of a final settlement and no
agreement was reached. [‗European Union Non-paper on the Taba Conference (2001)‘, in
MC Bassiouni (ed) Documents on the Arab-Israeli Conflict (Transnational Publishers,
Inc Aidsley New York 2005) vol 2, 1169-70]. By then, President Clinton was out of
office and Prime Minister Barak would be defeated by Ariel Sharon of the Likud party in
Israeli national elections in early February 2001. [W. Quandt, Peace Process: American
Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict since 1967 (Washington: Brookings Institute
Press, 2005) (3rd ed.)].

15 Intifada II (2000)
67. The second Palestinian intifada, or Al-Aqsa Intifada, occurred in the aftermath of a
visit by Likud opposition leader Ariel Sharon in late September 2000 to the Haram alSharif, the holy Muslim sanctuary in Jerusalem‘s Old City, several weeks after the end of
the Camp David II summit. Many Palestinians viewed the Sharon visit as a deliberate
provocation. Palestinian demonstrations erupted over the following three months in
Jerusalem across the occupied territories and within Israel. Nearly 500 people were killed
and over 10,000 injured during this period, the vast majority of them unarmed
Palestinians. The subsequent fact-finding commission into the causes of the Al-Asqa
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Intifada, led by former US Senator George Mitchell, recommended in April 2001 that the
violence end, that the parties implement ways to rebuild confidence, and that they resume
negotiations. It observed that: ‗[i]f the parties are to succeed in completing their journey
to their common destination, agreed commitments must be implemented, international
law respected, and human rights protected‘ [‗The Report of the Sharm el-Sheikh Fact
Finding Committee, (Mitchell Report), April 30, 2001 in MC Bassiouni (ed) Documents
on the Arab-Israeli Conflict (Transnational Publishers, Inc Aidsley New York 2005) vol
2, 1172, 1175].

68. However, the violence continued to escalate. A series of suicide bombings in March
2002 conducted by Hamas militants killed approximately 40 Israeli civilians, which led
the Israeli military to launch ‗Operation Defensive Shield‘. Israel re-occupied all of the
West Bank in order to arrest suspected terrorists, find weapons and destroy suspected
weapons-manufacturing facilities. The headquarters of the Palestinian Authority in
Ramallah was largely destroyed in the fighting, and President Arafat was confined to the
headquarters for the next two years. Approximately 500 Palestinians were killed in the
fighting. The UN Security Council expressed its concern in a series of resolutions
condemning terrorism, calling on all parties to observe international humanitarian law,
expressing concern about the grave humanitarian crisis faced by the Palestinian people,
and demanding the speedy withdrawal of Israeli forces from Ramallah and all other reoccupied Palestinian cities [UNSC Res 1435 (24 September 2002) UN Doc S/RES/1435;
UNSC Res 1405 (19 April 2002) S/RES/1405; UNSC Res 1403 (4 April 2002) UN Doc.
S/RES/1403; UNSC Res 1402 (30 March 2002) UN Doc S/RES/1402].

69. Just prior to the massive violence in late March and April 2002, the UN Security
Council adopted Resolution 1397 on 12 March 2002. For the first time, the Security
Council expressly endorsed a two-state solution for the conflict. It expressed ‗a vision of
a region where two States, Israel and Palestine, live side by side within secure and
recognized boundaries.‘ [UNSC Res 1397 (12 March 2002) UN Doc S/RES/1397].
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70. Two weeks later, at the Arab League summit in Beirut, Crown Prince Abdullah of
Saudi Arabia proposed a comprehensive peace plan for the settlement of the IsraeliPalestinian and Israeli-Arab conflict, based on Resolution 242 and the 1982 Fez Arab
Peace Plan. The Arab Peace Initiative Plan, which the Arab League adopted on 28 March
2002, had five principle elements: (1) full Israeli withdrawal from all the territories
occupied since the June 1967 war; (2) the establishment of a independent and sovereign
Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza, with East Jerusalem as its capital; (3) a ‗just
solution‘ of the Palestinian refugee problem based upon UNGA Resolution 194 of 1948;
(4) the end of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the establishment of a general peace
agreement between the Arab counties and Israel; and (5) normal relations between the
Arab world and Israel. [‗Arab Peace Initiative Established at the Arab League Summit,
March 28, 2002‘ in MC Bassiouni (ed) Documents on the Arab-Israeli Conflict
(Transnational Publishers Inc Aidsley New York 2005) vol 2, 1205].

71. In April 2002, the United Nations, the Russian Federation, the United States and the
European Union met in Madrid to form the ‗Quartet‘, which would focus the activities of
these states and institutions on securing the conditions for a lasting peace in the Middle
East. At the initial meeting in Madrid, the Quartet expressed concern about the
humanitarian crisis caused by the April 2002 conflict between Israel and the Palestinians,
reiterated that resolutions 242 and 338 were the foundation for peace, welcomed the Arab
peace plan issued two weeks previously, condemned terrorism, and called for an end to
all Israeli settlement activity and the Israeli occupation.[‗Letter from the Secretary –
General Containing a Joint Statement by the Quartet, April 10, 2002‘ in MC Bassiouni
(ed) Documents on the Arab-Israeli Conflict (Transnational Publishers Inc Aidsley New
York 2005) vol 2, 1206].

72. As the second Intifada intensified, international diplomatic efforts continued.
American President George Bush proposed a ‗roadmap‘ for peace on 24 June 2002,
calling for a ‗vision of two states, a secure State of Israel and a viable, peaceful,
democratic Palestine.‘ [‗Speech by United States President George W. Bush on Mid-East
Peace (24 June 2002)‘ in MC Bassiouni (ed) Documents on the Arab-Israeli Conflict
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(Transnational Publishers, Inc Aidsley New York 2005) vol 2, 1208]. The concept of the
Roadmap was subsequently endorsed by the Quartet in September 2002 [‗Communiqué
Issued by the Quartet‘ (17 September 2002)‘] and by the UN Security Council in
Resolution 1515 [(19 November 2003), both in MC Bassiouni (ed) Documents on the
Arab-Israeli Conflict (Transnational Publishers, Inc Aidsley New York 2005) vol 2,
1212, 1243]. The Roadmap was envisioned to be a ‗performance-based and goal-driven‘
plan to enable the establishment of a Palestinian state living in peace beside Israel within
a specific time line. This plan would ‗resolve the Israel-Palestinian conflict, and end the
occupation that began in 1967, based on the foundations of the [1991] Madrid
Conference, the principle of land for peace, UNSC Resolutions 242, 338 and 1397,
agreements reached by the parties‘ and the 2002 Arab Peace Plan. The Roadmap was to
have a three phase implementation process. Phase I – ending terror and violence,
normalizing Palestinian life and building Palestinian institutions – was to be completed as
early as May 2003. Phase II – the possible creation of an independent Palestinian state
with provisional borders and ‗attributes of sovereignty‘ – was to have been completed
between June and December 2003. And Phase III – the signing of a permanent status
agreement and an end to the conflict – was to have been completed no later than 2005.
[‗Elements of a Performance-Based Road Map to a Permanent Two-state Solution to the
Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (15 October 2002)‘ in MC Bassiouni (ed) Documents on the
Arab-Israeli Conflict (Transnational Publishers, Inc Aidsley New York 2005) vol 2,
1214]. By the end of 2003, however, terrorism had not been thwarted, no settlement
freeze had been implemented and Israel had not withdrawn from areas of the West Bank
that it had occupied after the start of the second Intifada. The Roadmap fell into
diplomatic limbo.

73. In April 2004, the United States formally revised its position on the status of Israeli
settlements. From the late 1960s until the end of the Carter presidency, the United States
had taken the position, in concert with the rest of the international community, that the
settlements were illegal under international law. This position shifted under President
Ronald Reagan, who downgraded the official American stance towards the settlements to
one that regarded them as being merely ‗an obstacle to peace.‘ This formal position
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changed once again in April 2004, when President George W. Bush and Israeli Prime
Minister Ariel Sharon exchanged letters on the issue of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In
these letters, President Bush formally acknowledged what had been the unspoken
American policy in previous years by accepting the permanency of the Israeli settlements
in East Jerusalem and the major settlement blocs in the West Bank. President Bush stated
in his letter that: ‗In light of new realities on the ground, including already existing major
Israeli population centers…any final status agreement will only be achieved on the basis
on mutually agreed changes that reflect these realities.‘ [GW Bush ‗Exchange of Letter
Between United States President George W. Bush and Israeli Prime Minister Ariel
Sharon (14 April 2004)‘ in MC Bassiouni (ed) Documents on the Arab-Israeli Conflict
(Transnational Publishers, Inc Aidsley New York 2005) vol 2, 1245, 1247]. The Jewish
settler population in the occupied territories, which stood at 258,000 in 1992, had grown
to 440,000 by 2004. [‗Comprehensive Settlement Population, 1972 – 2008)‘ at
Foundation for Middle East Peace, http://www.fmep.org/settlement_info/settlement-infoand-tables/stats-data/comprehensive-settlement-population-1972-2006]. By 2012, the
settler population had reached 540,000.

74. The special relationship between the United States and Israel has played a significant
role in the evolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Diplomatically and politically, the
United States has provided strong support for Israel at international forums, such as the
United Nations, and through its domestic legislatures, via resolutions of support and votes
of aid in Congress. According to the United States Congressional Research Service, ―U.S.
military aid has helped transform Israel‘s armed forces into one of the most
technologically sophisticated militaries in the world,‖ enabling Israel to ―maintain [its]
qualitative military edge.‖ After 1949, American aid levels to Israel were initially modest
and consisted largely of economic loans. However, after the 1967 war, the nature and
quantity of American assistance, particularly involving military hardware, increased
dramatically. Since 1974, Israel has been the largest recipient of American foreign
assistance. Tensions have occasionally risen between the two countries involving aid,
including the military use by Israel of American-made cluster bombs in Lebanon in 1982
and 2006, and Israel‘s ongoing civilian settlements in the occupied territories. [‗U.S.
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Foreign Aid to Israel,‘ Congressional Research Service (4 December 2009), located at:
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33222.pdf].

75. In 2002, Israel began the construction of a wall through the West Bank near the 1949
armistice line which would prevent armed Palestinian attacks on its civilian population
but would also place a number of Jewish settlements and a significant portion of the
occupied territories on the Israeli side of the wall. In December 2003, the United Nations
General Assembly voted in favour of seeking an advisory opinion from the International
Court of Justice on the legal consequences of the wall. [UNGA Res ES-10/14 (8
December 2003) UN Doc A/RES/ES-10/14]. On 9 July 2004, the International Court of
Justice ruled that the wall was a violation of international law and directed it to be
dismantled, with compensation to affected Palestinians. [‗International Court of Justice
Decision: Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territories (9 July 2004)‘ in MC Bassiouni (ed) Documents on the Arab-Israeli Conflict
(Transnational Publishers, Inc. Aidsley New York 2005) vol 2, 493-539]. On 20 July
2004, the United Nations General Assembly voted 150-6-10 to accept the ICJ ruling and
to demand that ‗Israel, the occupying power, comply with its legal obligations as
mentioned in the advisory opinion‘. The UNGA resolution also called upon all UN
members ‗to comply with their legal obligations as mentioned in the advisory opinion.‘
[UNGA Res ES-10/15 (20 July 2004) UN Doc A/RES/ES-10/15]. Earlier, on 30 June
2004, the Israeli Supreme Court ruled that sections of the wall had not met the
proportionality principle of minimizing its harm to Palestinians, and ordered those
specific sections to be moved [‗Israeli Supreme Court Decision: Beit Sourik Village
Council et al. v. The Government of Israel et al (30 June 2004)‘ in MC Bassiouni (ed)
Documents on the Arab-Israeli Conflict (Transnational Publishers, Inc Aidsley New York
2005) vol 2, 460-492].

16 Israeli Palestinians in Israel

76. In October 2000, at the beginning of the second Palestinian intifada, Israel police
clashed with Palestinian demonstrators in the Galilee, in northern Israel. Thirteen
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Palestinians, 12 of whom were Israeli citizens, were killed by the police. A subsequent
judicial inquiry called by the Israeli government – the Or Commission – criticized the
Israeli police for excessive force, and labelled the attitude of the Israeli government
towards the Palestinian minority within Israel as ―neglectful and discriminatory‖. [‗The
Official Summation of the Or Commission report‘ (2 September 2003) in Ha’aretz, at
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=335594&contrassID=2&subC
ontrassID=1&sbSubContrassID=0&listSrc=Y)]. Palestinian citizens of Israel have the
right to vote, and several Palestinian political parties have regularly won seats in the
Israeli Knesset. However, the Palestinian minority – which makes up approximately 20%
of Israel‘s population – suffers from inequalities in education rates, access to social and
health services, employment opportunities, land ownership and use, and state funding to
local municipalities. Among Israeli Palestinians, per capita income rates are significantly
lower, and poverty and unemployment levels are consistently higher in comparison to
Jewish Israelis. [‗2008 Human Rights Report: Israel and the Occupied Territories‘ (25
February 2009), U.S. Department of State, at: http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls /hrrpt/2008
/nea/119117.htm].

17 Israeli withdrawal from Gaza (2005)
77. Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon presented a disengagement plan to the Israeli
cabinet in April 2004 that proposed a unilateral Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip
and four small West Bank settlements. [‗Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon‘s
Disengagement Plan (18 April 2004‘ in MC Bassiouni (ed) Documents on the ArabIsraeli Conflict (Transnational Publishers, Inc Aidsley New York 2005) vol 2, 1250]. In
October 2004, the Israeli Knesset approved Sharon‘s Disengagement Plan with some
modifications. The Plan, as approved and executed, maintained Israeli military control at
all access points to Gaza, including the sea coast and air space, and the border with
Egypt. [‗Government Resolution Regarding the Disengagement Plan, June 6, 2004‘ in
MC Bassiouni (ed) Documents on the Arab-Israeli Conflict (Transnational Publishers,
Inc Aidsley New York 2005) vol 2, 1255]. The Plan was implemented in August 2005,
with Israel dismantling the 17 Jewish settlements in Gaza and evacuating all of the 8,000
settlers to Israel and the West Bank. The Israeli withdrawal from Gaza heightened

41

tensions within Ariel Sharon‘s Likud-led government, and he formed a new political
party, Kadima, in December 2005, attracting a number of former Likud ministers and
MKs. However, in January 2006, Sharon suffered a massive stroke, and fell into a
permanent coma. Ehud Olmert became the leader of Kadima, won the March 2006
elections, and formed a new government.

18 Lebanon War II (2006)
78. Following Israel‘s withdrawal from Lebanon in May 2000, the border between Israel
and Lebanon stayed relatively calm. Hezbollah, the Lebanese Shiite political party and
militia controlled the south of the country, with weaponry acquired from Iran.
Hezbollah‘s immediate animus against Israel was the continued Israeli detention of
Lebanese prisoners and Israel‘s control of the occupied Sheba‘a farms, on the IsraeliLebanese-Syrian borders. On 12 July 2006, Hezbollah militants attacked through a border
gate, killing eight Israeli soldiers, wounding and capturing two others, and taking the
captured soldiers into Lebanon. Israel cited this as a casus belli, and initiated air strikes
the following day on civilian infrastructure in Lebanon, including the Beirut international
airport and the main highway between Beirut and Damascus. The same day, Hezbollah
launched rockets into northern Israel, hitting Haifa. The Israeli air strikes and Hezbollah
missiles continued throughout the subsequent 34 days of the war.

79. On 23 July, Israeli land forces invaded southern Lebanon. They subsequently fought a
number of battles with Hezbollah militia units over the following three weeks. The
United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1701 on 11 August, which called for
a ‗full cessation of hostilities‘, the deployment of the Lebanese army and UNIFIL
soldiers to southern Lebanon, the full exercise of control by the Lebanese government
over weapons on its territory and the disarmament of all armed groups, and a ‗permanent
ceasefire‘ leading to a ‗long-term solution‘ [UNSC Res 1701 (11 August 2006) UN Doc
S/RES/1701]. By war‘s end, on 14 August, over 1,000 Lebanese, predominately civilians,
had been killed, and approximately one million people were displaced. Lebanon suffered
heavy damage to its infrastructure. Israel suffered approximately 119 military deaths and
39 civilian deaths, and more than 250,000 Israelis evacuated the north to escape the
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Hezbollah rockets. UNIFIL troops were subsequently placed throughout southern
Lebanon. In January 2008, the report of the Winograd Commission – appointed by the
Israeli government to investigate its conduct of the war – criticized the ―serious failings
and flaws in the lack of strategic thinking and planning, in both the political and the
military echelons.‖ [‗Winograd Commission Final Report‘ (January 30, 2008), located at:
http://www.cfr.org/publication/15385/winograd _commission _final _report.html].

19 Split between PA/PLO and Hamas (2007)
80. After the death of Yasser Arafat in November 2004, Mahmoud Abbas was elected
President of the Palestinian Authority in January 2005. He had previously served as
Prime Minister of the PA for eight months in 2002. In January of 2006, the Palestinian
Authority held its second national elections. Hamas, the Islamist party, won 74 seats in
the 132 seat Palestinian legislature, while the ruling party, Fatah, won 45 seats. The
popular vote was much closer, with Hamas receiving 44.5% and Fatah 41.4%. The 2006
election was broadly accepted, nationally and internationally, as free and fair, although
Israel and many Western governments viewed the election of a Hamas government as
unacceptable because of its Islamist politics and prior engagement in terrorism.

81. The following month, the US and the EU ceased assistance to the PA as it was now
led by Hamas, a US-designated ‗terrorist organization‘. Israel, which also designated
Hamas as a ‗terrorist organization‘, began to withhold the tax and customs receipts that it
collected monthly on the PA‘s behalf. As well, the PA also lost access to international
banking services and loans. As the already-strained Palestinian economy deteriorated
because of the loss of much of its foreign assistance, violence broke out between Fatah
and Hamas factions, and over 100 Palestinians were killed. On 8 February 2007, Hamas
and Fatah signed the Mecca Accord, a national unity agreement mediated by Saudi
Arabia which called for a coalition government, an end to the international boycott of the
PA, and an end to the factional Palestinian violence. Under the Mecca Accord, Hamas
and Fatah joined in a government coalition. However, the Accord disintegrated in midJune 2007, with Hamas taking control of Gaza and Fatah acquiring control of the West
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Bank. President Abbas appointed Salam Fayad as the new Prime Minister, and the PA
once again received international recognition. Hamas, which claimed to be the authentic
PA, was diplomatically isolated.

20 Annapolis Accord (2007)
82. On 27 November 2007, the United States, supported by the Quartet, hosted a one-day
Middle East peace conference at the US Naval Academy in Annapolis, Maryland,
attended by President George Bush, Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and President
Mahmoud Abbas. At the end of the conference, the three leaders issued a Joint
Understanding on Negotiations at the end of the Conference, which called for intensive
‗good faith bilateral‘ negotiations to achieve a peace treaty before the end of 2008 that
would lead to ‗two states, Israel and Palestine, living side by side in peace and security‘.
Israel and the Palestinian Authority also agreed that they would each fulfil their
obligations under the 2003 Roadmap until they reached a peace treaty. Following
Annapolis, the two parties conducted regular meetings through 2008, but the negotiations
did not result in any substantive progress towards a final peace treaty. On 16 December
2008, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1850 [UNSC Res 1850
(16 December 2008) UN Doc S/RES/1850], which welcomed the 2007 Annapolis Joint
Understanding, re-affirmed its support for the ‗two-state solution, building upon previous
agreements and obligations‘, and noted the importance of the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative.
Israel held elections in February 2009, electing Benyamin Netanyahu, the leader of the
Likud party, once again as Prime Minister. In June 2009, the new American president,
Barack Obama, delivered a major speech in Cairo, addressing the sometimes fraught
relationship between the United States and the Muslim world. In his speech, Obama cited
the ―unbreakable‖ bond between America and Israel, acknowledged the ―intolerable‖
situation and suffering of the Palestinians, and said that it was time for the Israeli
settlements to stop [‗Remarks by the President on A New Beginning‘ (4 June 2009),
located at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-atCairo-University-6-04-09/].
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21 The Conflict in Gaza (2008-09)

83. Following regular eruptions of violence between Israel and Hamas, an informal six
month ceasefire was reached in late June 2008. The ceasefire largely held, although Israel
maintained its blockade of Gaza, limiting the amount of food, fuel and other supplies that
could enter the territory. Shortly after the ceasefire expired in late December 2008, a
ferocious conflict ensued, with Israel bombing numerous Hamas targets and civilian
institutions in Gaza and subsequently sending in several thousand IDF ground troops and
tanks. Approximately 1,300 Palestinians, the majority estimated to be civilians, died in
the conflict, along with 13 Israelis. The United Nations Security Council passed
Resolution 1860 [UNSC Res 1860 (8 January 2009) UN Doc S/RES/1860], which called
for an immediate ceasefire and the full withdrawal of Israeli forces from Gaza. It also
requested international efforts to alleviate the humanitarian and economic situation in
Gaza, called for the prevention of illicit trafficking in arms into Gaza, and encouraged
intra-Palestinian reconciliation. In September 2009, the United Nations Human Rights
Council released the report of a fact-finding mission, chaired by retired South African
judge Richard Goldstone, which found that both Israel and Hamas had likely committed
war crimes during the Gaza conflict, with much of its focus on Israeli military actions.
[‗United Nations Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict‘ (September 15, 2009),
located at: http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/db7f1 3 669e3abfd88 525750 100
7e0e51 /7762c5ef0b1dea24852576650053d1aa?OpenDocument]. The findings of the
Goldstone report were accepted by the United Nations General Assembly in November
2009 [UNGA Res 64/10 (5 November 2009) UN Doc A/64/L.11].

22. Palestine at the United Nations (2011-12)

84. In November 2012, the President of the Palestinian Authority, Mahmoud Abbas,
requested that the status of Palestine at the United Nations General Assembly be
upgraded to Non-Member Observer State. The General Assembly, in UNGA Res. 67/19
(29 November 2012) voted in favour of the request by a vote of 138-9-41. The Resolution
also re-affirmed the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination on the
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Palestinian lands occupied by Israel since 1967, re-iterated its call for a two-state
solution, and urged the resumption of the stalled peace negotiations between Israel and
the Palestinians. Among other things, the new status would allow Palestine to seek
membership in various UN agencies, including the International Criminal Court. This
upgrading at the General Assembly followed an unsuccessful application by the
Palestinian Authority in the autumn of 2011 to the Security Council to be admitted as a
state member of the United Nations. Through President Obama, the United States had
announced that it would veto the application at the Security Council, on the basis of
prematurity as no final agreement on statehood had been reached through negotiations
between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. Following heavy lobbying by the United
States and other countries, only eight members of the Security Council had committed
support for the Palestinian Authority‘s application by early November, which was one
member short of passing a favourable resolution. However, had the resolution been put
to a vote at the Security Council, the US had announced that it intended to exercise its
veto.

C. Principle Legal Issues
1. Belligerent Occupation and the 4th Geneva Convention
85. The primary outcome of the June 1967 war was to bring the Egyptian Sinai peninsula,
the Egyptian-administered Gaza Strip, the Jordanian West Bank and East Jerusalem, and
the Syrian Golan Heights under Israeli military control. Between 1975 and 1982, Israel
returned the Sinai in territorial stages to Egypt. In 2005, Israel unilaterally withdrew its
remaining settlements and troops from Gaza, although it has continued to exercise
effective control over its land borders, airspace and sea coast. Israel also maintained
military control over different parts of southern Lebanon between 1982 and 2000. The
international community has consistently defined the Israeli control of these territories as
a belligerent occupation and therefore subject to the applicable international law on the
subject. In contrast, Israel has maintained that East Jerusalem is sovereign Israeli
territory, the Golan Heights are part of Israel through the formal application of its law,
jurisdiction and administration to the territory, its occupation of Gaza ended in 2005, and
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the West Bank is ‗disputed‘ or ‗administered‘ territory not subject to the international law
on belligerent occupation. Israel ratified Geneva Convention IV on 6 July 1951, Jordan
became a party to the Convention on 29 May 1951, and the Palestine Liberation
Organization made a unilateral declaration on 7 June 1982 to bind itself to the
Convention.

86. Shortly after the end of the June 1967 war, the UN Security Council unanimously
adopted Resolution 237, which recommended that the States involved in the war
scrupulously respect ‗the humanitarian principles governing…the protection of civilian
persons in time of war contained in the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949‘ (UNSC
Res 237 [14 June 1967]). Five months later in its cornerstone resolution on the Middle
East conflict, a unanimous Security Council called for the ‗withdrawal of Israel armed
forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict‘ (UNSC Res 242 [22 November
1967]).

87. In a number of subsequent resolutions, both the Security Council and the General
Assembly of the UN have specifically affirmed that the 1967 lands controlled by Israel
are occupied territories under international law and the protections of Geneva Convention
IV apply. In September 1969, the Security Council called upon Israel ‗scrupulously to
observe the provisions of the Geneva Conventions and international law governing
military occupation‘ (UNSC Res 271 [15 September 1969]). In May 2004, the Security
Council reiterated its position regarding: ‗the obligation of Israel, the occupying Power,
to abide scrupulously by its legal obligations and responsibilities under the Fourth
Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12
August 1949‘ (UNSC Res 1544 [19 May 2004]). In all, the Security Council has stated
that Geneva Convention IV applies to the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian and Arab
territories in more than 25 resolutions. Similarly, the General Assembly has adopted over
100 resolutions since 1967 holding that Geneva Convention IV applies to the situation. In
December 2009, the General Assembly ‗demand[ed] that Israel accept the de iure
applicability of the Convention in the Occupied Palestinian Territory including East
Jerusalem, and other Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967, and that it comply
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scrupulously with the provisions of the Convention‘ (UNGA Res 64/92 [19 January
2010]).

88. In July 2004, the International Court of Justice declared in its Advisory Opinion on
the Israeli construction of the wall in the West Bank that Geneva Convention IV applies
to Israel‘s occupation of the Palestinian and Arab territories captured in 1967. In para.
101, the ICJ ruled that it ‗considers that the Fourth Geneva Convention is applicable in
any occupied territory in the event of an armed conflict arising between two or more
High Contracting Parties. Israel and Jordan were parties to that Convention when the
1967 armed conflict broke out. The Court accordingly finds that that Convention is
applicable in the Palestinian territories which before the conflict lay to the east of the
Green Line and which, during that conflict, were occupied by Israel, there being no need
for any enquiry into the precise prior status of those territories‘ (Legal Consequences of
the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory [Advisory Opinion]
para. 101).

89. Belligerent occupation arises when the military forces of one party have taken
possession of enemy territory during an armed conflict (see → Occupation, Belligerent).
The obligations borne by a belligerent occupier are codified primarily in the Hague
Regulations of 1907 and in Geneva Convention IV of 1949 and its Additional Protocols.
Art. 43 of the 1907 Hague Regulations and Art. 64 of Geneva Convention IV are
considered the cornerstone of the occupier‘s obligations in the territory it occupies.
Benvenisti has posited that Hague Art. 43 has been increasingly disregarded, and its key
proscription––that the occupier should not change the laws in force in the occupied
territory––has become defunct. He asserts that the incorporation of this principle in
Geneva Convention IV‘s Art. 64 has not changed this fact, and that Israel is no different
than other recent occupiers in setting aside the principle. ‗The occupant‘s powers have
expanded through time to cover almost all the areas in which modern governments assert
legitimacy to police … contemporary attention is paid more to the interests of the
indigenous community under occupation rather than to the wishes of the ousted
government … [M]ost contemporary occupants ignored their status and their duties under
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the law of occupation‘ (Benvenisti [1993] 6). Dinstein comes to essentially the same
conclusion about the law of prolonged occupation, but concludes that it is based on a
broad reading of the Hague Regulations and Geneva Convention IV: ‗[T]he scope of
authority vested in the Occupying Powers must be commensurate with the objective
need—accelerating the longer the occupation lasts—to enact new legislation, to introduce
new development projects, and to consider new schemes of socio-economic reform‘
(Dinstein [2009] 287).

90. The High Contracting Parties to Geneva Convention IV, meeting in Geneva in
December 2001, called upon ‗the Occupying Power to fully and effectively respect the
Fourth Geneva Convention in the Occupied Palestinian Territory including East
Jerusalem, and to refrain from perpetrating any violation of the Convention‘
(‗Declaration of the Conference of High Contracting Parties to the Fourth Geneva
Convention‘ [5 December 2001]). At the same Conference, the → International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) said that it ‗has always affirmed the de iure
applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention to the territories occupied since 1967 by
the State of Israel including East Jerusalem‘ (‗Conference of High Contracting Parties to
the Fourth Geneva Convention: Statement by the International Committee of the Red
Cross‘ [5 December 2001]).

91. The Government of Israel has taken the position that, while it will generally apply the
humanitarian provisions of Geneva Convention IV within the 1967 Palestinian and Arab
territories, the Convention is not applicable de iure because the West Bank, East
Jerusalem and Gaza were not territories validly under Jordanian or Egyptian sovereignty
at the time of the 1967 war. The Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated in 2003 that:
‗The West Bank and Gaza Strip are disputed territories whose status can only be
determined through negotiations. Occupied territories are territories captured in war from
an established and recognized sovereign. As the West Bank and Gaza Strip were not
under legitimate and recognized sovereignty by any State prior to the Six Day War, they
should not be considered occupied territories‘ (Israel, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
‗Disputed Territories‘ [February 2003]).
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92. Israel‘s position was based upon two influential articles written shortly after the June
1967 war. Blum (later Israel‘s Ambassador to the UN) wrote in 1968 that, since Israel
acquired the territories through a defensive war and no State could demonstrate a better
title, its control of the Palestinian territories amounted to a valid title in international law
(Blum [1968]). Shamgar (later President of the Israeli Supreme Court) stated in 1971 that
the legal position of the territories captured by Israel in June 1967 was sui generis
because Jordan had acquired the West Bank and East Jerusalem following an unlawful
invasion in 1948. Similarly, Egypt had no better title to Gaza. Accordingly, the captured
Palestinian territories were not validly a ‗territory of a High Contracting Party,‘ as per
Art. 2 Geneva Convention IV (Shamgar; see also Gerson; Schwebel).

93.

Among legal scholars who are critical of Israel‘s position regarding the non-

applicability of Geneva Convention IV to the Palestinian and Arab territories, Dinstein
has written that the argument is ‗patently sterile‘, as the Convention applies to all armed
conflicts and all occupations. Dinstein notes that, notwithstanding this position, the Israeli
government has indicated an ad hoc acceptance of the Convention vis-à-vis the West
Bank when arguing before the Israeli Supreme Court (Dinstein 21, 30). Imseis has argued
that the ‗Missing Reversioner‘ theory is undermined by its reliance on the unsupported
concept of ‗defensive conquest‘, and by its inability to recognize the self-determination
rights of the Palestinian people in international law. He also noted that the Israeli
argument has found very little support among legal scholars or the international
community (Imseis [2003]; see also Kretzmer; Falk and Weston).

94.

The Supreme Court of Israel (sitting as the High Court) has declared that it is

competent, within limitations, to review the actions of the Israeli military authorities in
the occupied territories captured in 1967. The Court has accepted that the law of
belligerent occupation, as codified by the Hague Regulations, applies de facto to the legal
regime in Gaza (prior to Israel‘s withdrawal in 2005) and the West Bank, but not to East
Jerusalem (Ja’mait Ascan v IDF Commander in Judea and Samaria [1982]) 37 (4) PD
785). However, the Court has also declared that Geneva Convention IV is treaty law and
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has not become part of customary international law; as such, it is not applicable to the
occupied territories, and is not enforceable by the Israeli judiciary (Nasralla v IDF
Commander of the West Bank [1988] 43 (2) PD 265). Under Article 43 of the Hague
Regulations ―[the occupying power] shall take all the measures in his power to restore,
and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely
prevented, the laws in force in the country.‖ The Supreme Court has interpreted Article
43 to place some limitations on the authority of the Israeli military authorities, but also to
legitimize a broad range of security and political considerations when balanced against
the welfare and civil life of the local Palestinian population. In Ja’mait Ascan, the Court
accepted that the Israeli settlers on the West Bank are part of the local population for the
purposes of Article 43, and proceeded to approve the creation of a major highway
network in the occupied territories linking the settlements to Israel and Jerusalem. In
Abu-Aita v Commander of Judea and Samaria (1983) (37 (2) PD 197), the Court ruled
that integrating the economies of Israel and the occupied territories would benefit public
order and civil life for the local population, and endorsed the legality of applying a valueadded tax in the territories when it was introduced in Israel.

95. Israel has occupied the Palestinian territories and the Golan Heights since 1967.
International humanitarian law prohibits the occupier from altering the status quo
respecting the laws, economy and social structure of the occupied territory beyond what
is strictly dictated by military necessary and security. A significant legal question is
whether a prolonged occupation changes the legal dynamics of the governing rules of
belligerent occupation. The Israeli Supreme Court has addressed the issue of whether a
prolonged occupier can reform the laws and administrative structures of an occupied
territory to adapt to economic, social and political changes and whether doing so
entrenches the occupation in such a way as to defeat the purpose of the law on belligerent
occupation. The Supreme Court ruled that the occupier‘s powers widen as the occupation
lengthens: The Christian Society for the Sacred Places v Minister of Defence (1971) (26
(1) PD 574); Ja’mait Ascan (1982). Commenting on the prolonged Israeli occupation,
Dinstein maintains that a military government must be permitted some leeway in the
application of its lawmaking powers if the occupation becomes protracted (Dinstein 120).
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Roberts recommends that a prolonged occupation should become a distinct category
within the law of belligerent occupation, but insists that, whether short or prolonged, an
occupier‘s rights are significantly curtailed. Ben-Naftali, Gross and Michaeli submit that
belligerent occupation is meant to be temporary, and Israel‘s deliberate violation of this
principle renders its occupation unlawful per se. Benvenisti argues that the occupier in a
prolonged occupation must not be permitted to unilaterally extend its powers as
circumstances require, but should be required to engage the participation and input of the
indigenous community in the affairs of the territory (Benvenisti 147).
2. Refugees
96. The historical and legal issues underlying the Palestinian refugee problem have been
a major source of contention among Israel, the Palestinian Authority, and the Arab States.
In 2011, 4.9 million refugees were registered with the UN Relief and Works Agency for
Palestine Refugees (‗UNRWA‘), the specialized UN agency dedicated to the provision of
humanitarian assistance to the Palestinian refugees. The majority are refugees from the
1948 war and their descendants, while the rest are refugees and their descendants from
the 1967 war. UNRWA operates 58 Palestinian refugee camps in Jordan, Lebanon, Syria,
Gaza and the West Bank, with a total camp population in 2011 of 1.4 million refugees.

97.

The causes of the 1947–9 Palestinian refugee problem have been the subject of a

protracted historical debate. Count Folke Bernadotte, the first UN Mediator for Palestine,
stated in September of 1948: ‗The exodus of Palestinian Arabs resulted from panic
created by fighting in their communities, by rumours concerning real or alleged acts of
terrorism, or expulsion‘ (‗Progress Report of the UN Mediator on Palestine, 14,
Delivered to the General Assembly‘ [16 September 1948]). Some modern historians,
relying on archival material from Israeli State records, have maintained that the
leadership of the Zionist movement, through its Plan Dalet in the spring of 1948,
authorized the expulsion of the Palestinian Arab population from the designated Jewish
and Arab territories (Pappe; Masalha; Shlaim [1995]).
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98.

The official Israeli position is that the Palestinian Arabs left on their own volition

during the 1947–49 conflict or at the direction of the warring Arab armies (see
Government Press Office, State of Israel, ‗The Refugee Issue: A Background Paper‘
[October 1994]). Some modern historians who have adopted this position have suggested
various theories to explain the exodus of the Palestinian refugees including a direct call
by the Arab leadership to the population to leave, or that the Palestinian exodus was a
natural consequence of the tragedy of war. Some historians have also described the
refugee crisis of 1947–9 as a de facto exchange of Arab and Jewish populations (Karsh;
Sachar; Sykes).

99.

Israeli historian Benny Morris, among the first to review the declassified 1948

materials in the Israeli archives in the 1980s, has argued that many Palestinians fled their
homes in 1947–9 either because of Israeli military attacks or fear of such attacks. He has
also maintained that, while there was no centralized expulsion policy by the Israeli
leadership, expulsions of Palestinians regularly occurred during the war. Morris‘s central
argument was that the Palestinian refugee problem was ‗born of war, not of design‘
(Morris [1994] and [2004]).

100.

A number of contentious legal issues on the Palestinian refugee issue have

emerged over the years. The first has to do with the definition of Palestinian refugee. As
the Palestinian refugee problem grew in size and political importance in the autumn of
1948, the UN General Assembly passed Resolution 194 on 11 December 1948, which,
among other issues, addressed the Palestinian refugee crisis. Resolution 194 established
the United Nations Conciliation Commission (UNCCP), with a mandate to provide
international protection to the refugees, and defined the refugee population for whom it
was responsible: all persons displaced from their homes in Palestine due to the 1947-49
conflict. This group-based international protection definition would encompass over 8
million of the worldwide Palestinian population of approximately 10 million persons
today. In contrast, UNRWA‘s is a needs-based humanitarian definition which applies to
approximately 5 million of the total refugee population. Further complicating the
definition question is the debate over the provisions that purport to exclude Palestinian
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refugees from the coverage of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) mandate under its Statute, and the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees
under its Article 1D. These definitions and provisions affect what durable solutions are to
be afforded the Palestinian refugees, and the meaning of Paragraph 11 of Resolution 194
(UNGA Res 194 [III] [11 December 1948]).

101.

Resolution 194‘s formula for a durable solution for the refugees appeared in

paragraph 11: ‗[T]he refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with
their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and …
compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss
of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should
be made good‘. Resolution 194 has been re-affirmed virtually every year since its initial
passage by the General Assembly (UNGA Res 65/98 [12 December 2010]) (Akram and
Rempel).

102.

The second has to do with whether Palestinians have a right of return to any part

of the territory of historic Palestine. Central to this debate is the legal standing of UNGA
Resolution 194, and whether it provides a right for the Palestinian refugees to return to
their homes and properties in present-day Israel. Some leading legal academics have
argued that Resolution 194, as a General Assembly resolution, is nonbinding. Further,
they maintain that Resolution 194 neither creates a ‗right‘ to return nor affirms a preexisting legal right; that either permission to return or a ‗right‘ to return is preconditioned
on the refugees ‗living at peace‘ with Israel; and that Israel alone has the right to
determine when the preconditions have been fulfilled, when and how many refugees
might return as part of an overall peace agreement. This position interprets the phrase ‗his
own country‘ found in Art. 12 (4) International Convention on Civil and Political Rights
(1966) and Art. 13 (2) Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) to mean that the
right to return extends only to a State‘s own nationals; this would not apply to Palestinian
refugees, who are neither citizens nor nationals of Israel. Above all, permitting a
substantial right of return is seen in Israel‘s eyes, as an ‗existential threat‘ (Peters and
Gal; Lapidoth; Radley)
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103.

Other legal scholars writing on the issue have maintained that Resolution 194 has

a broad meaning and application, and is based on concrete legal rights for Palestinian
refugees found in a number of distinct bodies of law. In their view, Resolution 194 and its
regular re-affirmation requires Israel to admit the refugees back to their homes on the
basis of nationality, state succession, and non-discrimination principles that prohibit
denationalization of ‗habitual residents‘ of the territory of a successor state and prohibit
discriminatory application of nationality laws (Oppenheim; Brownlie). These principles
are found in such treaties as the International Convention on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination (1965). Other scholars argue that the right of Palestinians to return to
place of origin is based on humanitarian law principles found in the Fourth Geneva
Convention that guarantee the right to return at the end of conflict. These positions are
based on the fact that the Palestinians were the ‗habitual residents‘ of what was once
Palestine and now is Israel. This right applies to both the 1948 and the 1967 refugees, and
their descendants. Furthermore, some of these scholars assert that this right vests in the
individual refugees, and cannot be waived or surrendered by a political institution
(Quigley; Takkenberg; Lawand). Finally, scholars ground the right of Palestinian refugee
return in modern principles of international refugee law (Goodwin-Gill; Akram and
Rempel).

104.

A third significant area of legal controversy on the Palestinian refugee issue is the

issue of restitution and compensation of Palestinian refugee properties and other losses.
This debate focuses on the individual and collective claims of the Palestinian refugees for
the restitution of their lost homes and properties in present day Israel, as well as monetary
damages for related losses. Israel‘s position is that Palestinian refugee property was taken
in exchange for the property Jews left behind in Arab states, and that only compensation
will be awarded in a final settlement. Israel has stated its preference for a global
collective fund which would be primarily used for refugee resettlement either in a
Palestinian State or elsewhere in the world, and financed largely by the international
community. Any contributions made by Israel would be ex-gratis, and not arise from any
legal or financial liability (‗Private [Israeli] Response on Palestinian Refugees‘, Taba
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Talks [23 January 2001]) The Palestinians have argued that international law supports
Israel‘s obligation to restitute Palestinian properties and pay for refugee properties
expropriated or destroyed in 1948 and afterwards in present-day monetary valuations. As
well, they assert that additional damages are owed for individual and collective suffering,
for Israel‘s use of Palestinian properties since 1948, and for rehabilitation (‗Palestinian
Non-Paper on Palestinian Refugees‘, Taba Talks [23 January 2001]; see also Lynk;
Benvenisti and Zamir).

105.

During the negotiations process on the resolution of the Palestinian refugee issue,

Israel has regularly advanced the issue of Jewish refugees from Arab lands who left, or
were forced to leave, their homes and properties in 1948 and afterwards. This issue has
been raised in the context of requesting compensation for the material and non-material
losses of these refugees. The Palestinian position has consistently been that the issue of
compensation for the Jewish refugees should not be linked to the Palestinian refugee
issue; rather, this issue should be negotiated by Israel with the responsible Arab
governments.

106.

UN Security Council Resolution 242 of 22 November 1967 called for ‗the

necessity [of] achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem‘, without further
guidance. The 1993 Declaration of Principles, the initial legal and diplomatic framework
between Israel and the PLO, provided that the refugee question would be one of the
‗final-status‘ issues to be addressed at the end of the envisioned five year process. While
the DOP stated that its purpose was to recognize mutual legitimate and political rights, it
did not define them with respect to any of the ‗final-status‘ issues including the refugee
issue (‗Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements between
Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization‘ in Bassiouni [ed] vol 2, 890–897).

107.

The 2000 Camp David talks did not result in any agreements. While the Taba

Summit in January 2001 also did not reach a peace agreement, it did produce two
separate draft proposals from Israel and the PLO on the Palestinian refugees. The
Palestinian proposal rests on an interpretation of UNGA 194 grounding a right of return
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in human rights and humanitarian law. It focused on refugee choice of returning to home
or land within 1948 Israeli borders, or from available resettlement options. The
Palestinian proposal discussed Israel‘s moral and legal responsibility for forced
displacement and dispossession of Palestinian refugees in 1948 and for preventing their
return (‗Palestinian Non-Paper on Palestinian Refugees‘ Taba Talks [23 January 2001]).
The Israeli proposal includes the Israeli narrative of the Palestinian refugee issue, a
framework for solution and mechanism for implementation, modalities for compensation
and rehabilitation, a special clause for Jewish refugees, and an ‗end of claims‘ clause.
The five options set out in the Israeli proposal are a limited number of refugees
‗returning‘ to Israel; a land swap; resettlement primarily in a Palestinian State;
rehabilitation in Arab host countries; or resettlement in third States (‗Private [Israeli]
Response on Palestinian Refugees‘ Taba Talks [23 January 2001]).

108.

Following the demise of the Oslo Process after Camp David and the Taba

Summit, the next initiative on the Palestinian refugees came from the Quartet and its
Performance-Based Road Map issued in April 2003. The Road Map, similar to the Oslo
DOP, sought to resolve the refugee issue during the third and final phase of the renewed
peace process. As part of this third stage, the parties were to: ‗reach final and
comprehensive permanent status agreement that ends the Israel-Palestinian conflict in
2005, through a settlement negotiated between the parties based on UNSC Res. 242, 338
and 1397, that ends the occupation that began in 1967, and includes an agreed, just, fair,
and realistic solution to the refugee issue‘ (‗Elements of a Performance-Based Road Map
to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict, 15 October 2002‘
in Bassiouni [ed] vol 2, 1214).
3. Jerusalem
109.

Jerusalem is unique among cities. As a centre of religious faith, it is holy to

Christianity, Islam and Judaism. As a city of politics, it is highly contested, with both
Israel and the Palestinians claiming it as their political capital. As an urban habitat, it is
demographically divided, with Jews and Palestinians living in separate districts and
neighbourhoods, and possessing different levels of access to services, opportunities and
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rights. In international law, the special status of Jerusalem has been regularly addressed
by the UN and the international community, particularly since 1947.

110.

In the November 1947 partition plan adopted by the UN General Assembly in

Resolution 181, Jerusalem was designated as a corpus separatum, politically separate
from the proposed Jewish and Arab States and governed under a special international
trusteeship to be overseen by the UN. This proposal for a separate administrative regime
for Jerusalem had been earlier recommended by the partition proposals contained in the
1937 Peel Commission report and the 1947 UNSCOP report.

111.

With the ensuing war, the proposal for the internationalization of Jerusalem was

effectively stillborn. The Israel-Jordan General Armistice Agreement of April 1949
confirmed the de facto division between eastern and western Jerusalem as the armistice
line, but did not confer de jure sovereignty over Jerusalem to either side (‗General
Armistice Agreement between Israel and Jordan, 3 April 1949‘ in Moore [ed] vol III,
397-406).

112.

Following the defeat of Jordan in June 1967, Israel occupied East Jerusalem and

the West Bank. On 27 June 1967, the Israeli Knesset extended its jurisdiction to any part
of ‗Eretz Israel‘ designated by the Government. Israel immediately applied its authority
to incorporate East Jerusalem and parts of the West Bank into the Jerusalem municipality
(‗Israel‘s 1967 Enactments concerning the Application of Israeli Law, Jurisdiction and
Administration to East Jerusalem, 27 June 1967‘ in Lapidoth and Hirsch [eds] 167–8).
Soon afterwards, the Government of Israel initiated intensive settlement construction for
Israeli Jews in East Jerusalem, and by 1972 approximately 8,600 Israeli Jews were living
in settlements in eastern Jerusalem.

113.

The UN Security Council subsequently adopted a number of resolutions

concerning the status of Jerusalem. In Resolution 476 of 30 June 1980, the Security
Council deplored ‗the persistence of Israel in changing the physical character,
demographic composition, institutional structure and the status of the Holy City of
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Jerusalem;‘ affirmed the application of Geneva Convention IV to the occupation of
Jerusalem; and stated that ‗all measures which have altered the geographic, demographic
and historical character and status of the Holy City of Jerusalem are null and void.‘
(UNSC Res 476 [30 June 1980]). Similarly, UNSC Resolution 298, adopted in
September 1971, deplored ‗the failure of Israel to respect the previous resolutions‘ on
Jerusalem, confirmed ‗that all legislative and administrative actions taken by Israel to
change the status of Jerusalem … are totally invalid and cannot change that status‘, and
called upon Israel ‗to rescind all previous measures and actions and to take no further
steps in the occupied section of Jerusalem which may purport to change the status of the
City‘ (UNSC Res 298 [25 September 1971]).

114.

In the 1993 Oslo Declaration, Jerusalem was identified by the parties as one of the

final status issues, which would be negotiated as part of a permanent peace agreement
(‗Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements between Israel and
the Palestinian Liberation Organization‘ in Bassiouni [ed] vol 2, 890–897, Art. V (3)).
Following the failure of the Camp David summit in July 2000, President Bill Clinton
issued the ‗Clinton Parameters‘ in December 2000, which stated that the general principle
pertaining to Jerusalem and the Old City would be that ‗Arab areas are Palestinian and
Jewish areas are Israeli‘. As for the Old City, the Clinton Parameters recommended
‗Palestinian shared sovereignty over the Haram and Israeli sovereignty over the Western
Wall‘ (‗Clinton Parameters to Palestinian and Israeli Negotiators, 23 December 2000‘ in
Bassiouni [ed] vol 2, 1160–2). The two sides subsequently accepted this general principle
during further peace negotiations at Taba, Egypt in January 2001, although the
Palestinian side rejected Israeli sovereignty over the Ma‘ale Adumim and Givat Ze‘ev
settlements near Jerusalem (‗European Union Non-Paper on the Taba Conference, 2001‘
in Bassiouni [ed] vol 2, 1169–70).

115.

Among legal scholars, Dinstein has noted that, while the Supreme Court of Israel

has accepted the Israeli annexation of East Jerusalem in a series of cases, ‗it is abundantly
clear that the unilateral annexation of East Jerusalem by Israel is not valid under
international law‘ (Dinstein 18–19). Imseis has argued that both the Israeli settlements
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and the 1980 annexation legislation are part of Israel‘s demographic re-engineering of
Jerusalem in order to assert sovereignty, and, as such, are prohibited under international
law (Imseis [2000]). Gerson wrote that any Israeli claim to sovereignty over East
Jerusalem would be treated no differently in law than its claim to the West Bank, as ‗both
seem to stand or fall on the same merits‘ (Gerson 213–214). Blum maintained that Jordan
did not possess valid sovereignty over East Jerusalem or the West Bank prior to the June
1967 war, and therefore Israel was entitled to extend its laws and administration to these
lands on the same basis as the lands that were not assigned to Israel by Resolution 181,
but over which it acquired sovereignty after the 1947–9 war (Blum [1974]).
4. Settlements
116.

The legality of the Israeli civilian settlements constructed in the occupied

Palestinian and Arab territories has been a controversial topic since their inception shortly
after the June 1967 war. Most diplomatic, judicial and legal commentators have
maintained that the settlements are illegal under international law, while a minority view
has argued that they are lawful.

117.

The analysis employed by commentators and scholars respecting the settlements‘

legality commonly starts with the foundational instruments of international humanitarian
law. The Hague Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land (annexed
to the Convention respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land), which emerged out
of the Hague Peace Conferences (1899 and 1907), implicitly prohibit the demographic
transformation of an occupied territory by designating the occupying power as an interim
administrator and usufructuary, with no greater power over the territories than to protect
and beneficially manage them for the indigenous population until their eventual return to
the new sovereign government: Arts 43, 46, 52, 55. After World War II, the international
community adopted the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons
in Time of War (‗Geneva Convention IV‘) to extend protection to civilians in time of
armed conflict. The Convention expressly prohibits the implantation of settlers by the
occupying power in the territories that it occupies. Art. 49 (6) Geneva Convention IV
states that: ‗the Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its civilian
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population into the territory it occupies‘. Israel ratified the Geneva Convention IV on 6
July 1951.

118.

In its July 2004 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the

Occupied Palestinian Territory, the International Court of Justice declared that: ‗… the
Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory [including East Jerusalem] have
been established in breach of international law‘. In doing so, the Court held that Art. 49
(6) prohibits not only forcible transfers, ‗but also any measures taken by an occupying
Power in order to organize or encourage transfers of parts of its own population into the
occupied territory‘ (at para. 120).

119.

The International Committee of the Red Cross released a study in 2005 which

sought to identify the established rules of customary international humanitarian law. The
ICRC concluded that that the overwhelming weight of present evidence — Geneva
Convention IV of 1949, the 1998 Statute of Rome, military manuals from a number of
respected countries, UN resolutions, the domestic legal codification of the prohibition by
a number of States, and commentaries by international organizations, among others —
established that the prohibition against settler implantation had become a rule of
customary international humanitarian law (‗Rule 130‘ in Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck
462). At least one commentator has criticized the study (see Dinstein [2006]).

120.

Additional Protocol I of the Four Geneva Conventions (1977), Art. 85 (4) (a)

reiterates the prohibition against transfer of the population of the occupier into the
territory it occupies, and elevates the prohibition from a ‗breach‘ of Geneva Convention
IV to a ‗grave breach.‘ The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC),
moreover, proscribes settler implantation as a ‗war crime.‘ Art. 8 (2) (b) (viii) prohibits:
‗The transfer, directly or indirectly, by the Occupying Power of parts of its own civilian
population into the territory it occupies….‘ There remains a debate on whether the First
Additional Protocol and the Rome Statute have become part of customary international
law. Israel is not a party to either Additional Protocol I or the Rome Treaty, primarily
because of the inclusion of the prohibition against civilian settlements in occupied
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territories (see Statement by Judge Eli Nathan, Head of the Delegation of Israel to the
United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court, 9th Plenary Meeting [17 July 1998]
<http://www.un.org/icc/speeches/717isr.htm> [30 August 2011]).

121.

In December 1971, the UN General Assembly passed the first of many resolutions

over the years condemning the Israeli settlements, maintaining that: ‗all measures taken
by Israel to settle the occupied territories including occupied Jerusalem, are completely
null and void‘ (UNGA Res 2851 [XXVI] [20 December 1971]). The UN Security
Council adopted five resolutions in 1979 and 1980 criticizing the settlements as a
violation of international law. On 1 March 1980, the Security Council adopted its lead
resolution, UNSC Resolution 465, which states that: ‗… Israel‘s policy and practices of
settling parts of its population and new immigrants in those territories constitute a
flagrant violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War and also constitute a serious obstruction to achieving a
comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East‘. Resolution 465 also called
upon Israel to dismantle the existing settlements.

122.

Various influential regional, humanitarian and human rights organizations have

commented on the legal status of the Israeli settlements. The Council of the European
Union in 2008 stated that ‗... settlement building anywhere in the occupied Palestinian
Territories including East Jerusalem, is illegal under international law‘ (‗Declaration by
the Presidency on Behalf of the European Union on the Middle East‘ [14 March 2008]).
The Conference of the High Contracting Parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention issued
a declaration in December 2001, which reaffirmed its position on ‗… the illegality of
settlements in the [occupied Palestinian Territories including East Jerusalem], and of the
extension thereof‘. Amnesty International has commented on the issue, stating in 2003
that: ‗The establishment of settlements violates international humanitarian law and
constitutes a serious violation of the prohibition on discrimination‘ (‗Israel and the
Occupied Territories: The Issue of Settlements Must Be Addressed According to
International Law‘ [8 September 2003]).
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123.

A number of scholars have judged the settlements to be contrary to international

law. According to Kretzmer: ‗the widely accepted view is that [Art. 49 Geneva
Convention IV] does apply to establishment, or even promotion, of civilian settlements
… Establishing civilian settlements in occupied territory in order to further the economic
or political interests of the occupying power is incompatible with these principles [of
customary international law]‘ (Kretzmer 77). Imseis cited a range of human rights
concerns caused by the settlements, finding that: ‗in addition to violating Article 49 of the
Fourth Geneva Convention, Israel‘s Jewish colonial settlements in the OPT potentially
represent very serious transgressions of other international human rights and criminal law
conventions …‘ (Imseis [2003] 106–7). Dinstein viewed the 2004 pronouncement of the
ICJ that the Israeli settlements are illegal as ‗unassailable‘, but was critical of the view
which assumes the illegality of those settlements where ‗settlers have acted entirely on
their own initiative‘ rather than relying upon the support or encouragement of the State
(Dinstein 240–241).

124.

The Government of Israel has consistently maintained that its settlement project

conforms to international law. The Israeli Foreign Ministry has stated that Geneva
Convention IV does not apply to the Palestinian territories, since they were ‗not under the
legitimate sovereignty of any state‘ at the time of the June 1967 war, and therefore the
prohibitions against settler implantation do not apply. Furthermore, the Foreign Ministry
interprets Art. 49 Geneva Convention IV as ‗intended to protect the local population from
displacement including endangering its separate existence as a race, as occurred with
respect to the forced population transfer in Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary before
and during the war. This is clearly not the case with regard to the West Bank and Gaza‘.
It also argues that Art. 49 (6) was intended to prohibit only the forcible transfer of the
population of the occupying power, and does not apply to the voluntary migration of the
occupier‘s civilian population (‗Israeli Settlements and International Law‘ [May 2001]).

125.

Among those legal scholars disputing the designation of the Israeli settlements as

illegal, Rostow argued that the 1922 Mandate of the League of Nations permitted ‗―close
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settlement by Jews‖ in all of Palestine‘, and this right continued after the end of the
Mandate because no trusteeship agreement was reached under Art. 80 UN Charter,
‗which leaves intact the Jewish right of settlement in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip‘
(Rostow 9–10). In his 1978 analysis, Gerson wrote that: ‗in the perspective of
contemporary international law, Israel‘s land acquisition and settlement policy was not
unlawful as it neither aimed for, nor neared, a stage involving displacement of the
existing population as a prelude to future annexation‘ (Gerson 173). Stone maintained
that Geneva Convention IV did not apply to Israel‘s acquisition of the Palestinian
territories in 1967 but, if it did, Art. 49 (6) would not be engaged because the provision
was intended to prohibit ‗the impairment of the economic situation or racial integrity of
the native population of the occupied territory or inhuman treatment of its own
population‘, neither of which had been a practice of the Israeli government in the
territories (Stone 177–181).

126.

The Supreme Court of Israel (sitting as the High Court of Justice) has not taken a

position on the legality of the settlements, holding that the issue is non-justiciable. In
1979, the High Court of Justice ruled in the Elon Moreh case that private Palestinian
lands could not be requisitioned for settlements under customary international law if the
dominant purpose was for political reasons rather than for military needs (Dweikat v
Israel HCJ 390/79). However, in this and subsequent decisions, the High Court has
specifically declined to rule on the general application of international law including Art.
49 (6) Geneva Convention IV, to the settlements. In 2005, the Court issued Mara’abe v
The Prime Minister of Israel, dealing with the route of the Wall around the Jewish
settlement of Alfei Menashe. In the decision, it stated: ‗It is not relevant … to examine
whether this settlement activity conforms to international law or defies it, as determined
in the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice at The Hague. For this
reason, we shall express no position regarding that question‘ (HCJ 7957/04 para. 19).

5. The Wall Opinion
127. Israel‘s construction of a 670 kilometre wall and barrier through the West Bank and
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East Jerusalem has generated international controversy. In July 2004, the International
Court of Justice issued an Advisory Opinion on request by the General Assembly, stating
that the Wall violated international human rights and humanitarian law, and that Israel
was obliged to dismantle it, and pay reparations to the Palestinian victims.

128. In Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, Advisory Opinion [[2004] I.C.J. 136 (July 9)], the ICJ found, in a 14-1
decision, that the construction of the Israeli Wall in occupied territory violated
international law. The Wall Opinion dealt with seven significant legal issues. The ICJ
concluded: (1) that it had jurisdiction to render the advisory opinion as requested by the
General Assembly; (2) that there were no compelling political or diplomatic reasons for it
to not render the opinion; (3) that the Wall as currently constructed within the occupied
territories and East Jerusalem violates international law; (4) that Israel must immediately
stop construction, dismantle the Wall, terminate its breaches of international law in
maintaining the Wall regime, and nullify all related legislation, actions and policies; (5)
that Israel must restore all Palestinian properties confiscated in construction of the wall
and pay reparations for all damage caused by such construction; (6) that the community
of States has an obligation to ensure compliance with the Fourth Geneva Convention of
1949, not to recognize Israel‘s actions in constructing the Wall and establishing the Wall
regime, and to cease all aid to Israel that supports its acts; and, (7) finally, that the United
Nations, particularly the General Assembly and the Security Council, must take further
action to terminate the illegal situation resulting from the Wall‘s construction.

129. On the main issues of jurisdiction, the finding of illegality of the Wall, the
requirements to terminate the breaches, restore Palestinian property and pay damages, the
justices voted 14-1. On five of the issues, the sole dissenter was the American justice,
Thomas Buergenthal. On the issues regarding the obligation of other states not to
recognize Israeli actions regarding the Wall, to take steps to ensure Israeli compliance
with the Opinion, and to cease all aid to Israel that supports the Wall regime, the justices
voted 13 in favour, with Justice Kooijmans of the Netherlands joining Buergenthal in the
2 votes against.
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130. This was the first time the ICJ rendered an opinion directly on the lengthy PalestineIsrael conflict, and the high level of agreement of the justices on many of the key
questions that have persisted in this situation reflects the legal consensus that has been
reached on these questions in the interim. Among the substantive conclusions the Court
reached were that the Palestinian people were entitled to self-determination; that the areas
between ‗the Green Line and the former eastern boundary of Palestine under the
Mandate‘ as well as East Jerusalem, were occupied by Israel as a matter of international
law; that Israel was bound to the Hague Regulations of 1907 and the Fourth Geneva
Convention of 1949 in its actions in the Occupied Territories; and that Israel was also
bound to the human rights treaties it had ratified, which were fully applicable in the
Occupied Territories.

131. Among the important conclusions drawn by the ICJ were those on the applicability
of the Fourth Geneva Convention to the conflict. The Court rejected the ‗missing
reversioner‘ argument – an argument promoted by some Israeli jurists but which was not,
according to the Court, supported by international legal authority. The ICJ stated: ―[It]
considers that the Fourth Geneva Convention is applicable in any occupied territory in
the event of an armed conflict arising between two or more High Contracting Parties.
Israel and Jordan were parties to that Convention when the 1967 armed conflict broke
out. The Court accordingly finds that that Convention is applicable in the Palestinian
territories which before the conflict lay to the east of the Green Line and which, during
that conflict, were occupied by Israel, there being no need for any enquiry into the precise
prior status of those territories.‖ [Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. at 177]. Additionally, the
Court found that Israel was bound to the provisions of the 1907 Hague Regulations,
particularly Section III concerning military authority over hostile territory, as the
Regulations had become customary international law governing situations of military
occupation.

132. After concluding that Israel was required to apply the main body of international
humanitarian rules, the International Court addressed the applicability of international
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human rights conventions in the occupied territories. The three main international human
rights instruments of concern to the Court were: the 1966 International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR), the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC).
Noting that Israel was party to all three instruments, the ICJ held that these conventions
apply both in peacetime and during armed conflict, limited only by their derogation
clauses. All three instruments, moreover, had already been construed by their interpretive
bodies to clearly extend to areas outside a State‘s territory but under its effective
jurisdiction or control. Having found that all of these treaties and conventions applied, the
ICJ ruled that the construction of the Wall in the occupied territories contravened both
international humanitarian and human rights law.

133. By unanimous vote, the Court found that Israel had breached key principles of
international human rights law: ―[T]he Court is of the opinion that the construction of the
wall and its associated regime impede the liberty of movement of the inhabitants of the
Occupied Palestinian Territory (with the exception of Israeli citizens and those
assimilated thereto) as guaranteed under Article 12, paragraph 1, of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. They also impede the exercise by the persons
concerned of the right to work, to health, to education and to an adequate standard of
living as proclaimed in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights and in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. Lastly, the
construction of the wall and its associated regime, by contributing to the demographic
changes referred to [above], contravene Article 49, paragraph 6, of the Fourth Geneva
Convention and the Security Council Resolutions.‖ [Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. at
191-192].

134. As to remedies, the ICJ concluded that Israel was obliged to cease construction,
dismantle the Wall, terminate the breaches of international law the Court found were
involved in the Wall regime, and to nullify all related legislation and policies. In
declaring the ‗wall regime‘ illegal, the Court addressed the process of granting permits to
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Jews to pass through the Wall gates, but denying such permits to Palestinians, and linked
these conclusions to its findings on violations of Palestinian human rights.

135. The Israeli Supreme Court also heard petitions challenging the legality of the Wall,
and came to a different conclusion — that the Wall complied with legal requirements, but
that portions of it must be relocated to reduce harm to Palestinian villagers. [HCJ 2056/04
Beit Sourik Vill. Council v. Israel [2004] 43 ILM 1099]. The two decisions were made a
week apart, purportedly relied on the same international legal principles, but drew
differing conclusions.

136. Both the ICJ and the Israeli Supreme Court found that the Wall violated
humanitarian law because of the extent to which it impacts the existence and livelihood
of the Palestinian civilian population. Both found that the damage to Palestinian rights
was disproportionate to Israel‘s security concerns, but required different outcomes as a
result. The ICJ found the entire construction of the Wall to be unlawful, as well as its
‗associated regime.‘ The Israeli Supreme Court found that ―some deviation from the
Green Line was acceptable, but that in many instances the Israel Defense Forces had
routed the wall as to cause disproportionate harm to the Palestinian population.‖
[Geoffrey R. Watson, ―The ‗Wall‘ Decisions in Legal and Political Context‖, 99 AJIL 6,
8 (2005)]. It invalidated orders for the construction of several parts, and required that the
IDF reroute the wall to decrease the impact on Palestinian life.

137. Most of the academic debate over the Wall Opinion has focused on the question of
whether self-defense or proportionality could justify construction of the Wall. The ICJ
concluded that neither humanitarian law‘s ‗military necessity‘ nor the UN Charter‘s Art.
51 exceptions applied, without much explanation or analysis. In contrast, the Israeli
Supreme Court gave a detailed three-part analysis of the ‗proportionality‘ test that
allowed it to weigh the security concerns against the humanitarian, an approach
commentators have considered superior. [See Geoffrey R. Watson, ―The ‗Wall‘
Decisions in Legal and Political Context,‖ 99 AJIL 6-26 (2005); and David Kretzmer,
―The Advisory Opinion: The Light Treatment of International Humanitarian Law,‖ 99
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AJIL 88-102 (2005)].

138. The separate opinions of at least three of the Justices reflect the scope of the debate
over the self-defense and proportionality issues. Justice Higgins disagreed with the
majority that ―an attack originating in the West Bank could not be an armed attack by a
‗state,‘‖ finding that Art. 51 had no such requirement. [Geoffrey R. Watson, ―The ‗Wall‘
Decisions in Legal and Political Context,‖ 99 AJIL at 18(2005) (referring to Advisory
Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. at 215 (Separate Opinion of Judge Higgins))]. Justice Kooijmans
claimed that ―Security Council Resolutions 1368 and 1373 had broadened the notion of
self-defense so as to include ‗international terrorism‘ not necessarily attributable to a
particular state,‖ and claimed that the Court had ignored this change in self-defense law.
However, he could not agree that terror attacks from occupied territories could be
characterized as ‗international.‘ [Id. (referring to Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. at 230
(Separate Opinion of Judge Kooijmans)]. Justice Buergenthal, as well, found that Art. 51
is not limited to state-sponsored ‗armed attack,‘ and that recent UN Security Council
Resolutions supported that view. He concluded that attacks coming from the West Bank
triggered Art. 51, and he faulted the Court for failing to analyze whether the Wall was a
necessary and proportionate response to that threat. [Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. at
241-243 (Separate Opinion of Judge Buergenthal)]. For academic viewpoints challenging
the Wall Opinion along similar lines, see Sean D. Murphy, ―Self-Defense and the Israeli
Wall Advisory Opinion: An Ipse Dixit from the ICJ?,‖ 99 AJIL 62-76 (2005); Michla
Pomerance, ―The ICJ‘s Advisory Jurisdiction and the Crumbling Wall between the
Political and the Judicial,‖ 99 AJIL 26-42 (2005); Arthur Watts, ―Israeli Wall Advisory
Opinion (Legal Consequences of a Wall in the Occupied Territory),‖ Max Planck
Encyclopedia of International Law, available at http://www.mpepil.com.ezproxy.
bu.edu/subscriber_article?id=/epil/entries/law-9780199231690-e150; and Ruth
Wedgwood, ―The ICJ Advisory Opinion on the Israeli Security Fence and the Limits of
Self-Defense,‖ 99 AJIL 52-61 (2005). For academic viewpoints generally supportive of
the Wall Opinion, see Susan M. Akram and Michael Lynk, "The Wall and the Law: A
Tale of Two Judgements," 24 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 61 (2006); Pieter
H.F. Bekker, ―The World Court's Ruling Regarding Israel's West Bank Barrier and the
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Primacy of International Law: An Insider's Perspective‖, 38 Cornell Int'l L.J. 553 (2005);
Paul J. I. M. De Waart, ―International Court of Justice Firmly Walled in the Law of
Power in the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process‖, 18 Leiden J. Int'l L. 467 (2005); Richard
A. Falk, ―Toward Authoritativeness: The ICJ Ruling on Israel's Security Wall,‖ 99 AJIL
42-52 (2005); Ardi Imseis, ―Critical Reflections on the International Humanitarian Law
Aspects of the ICJ Wall Advisory Opinion‖; 99 AJIL 102-118 (2005); and Iain Scobbie,
―Words My Mother Never Taught Me: ‗In Defense of the International Court‘‖, 99 AJIL
76-88 (2005).
139. On 15 September 2005, the Israeli Supreme Court issued Mara’abe vs The
Prime Minister of Israel, dealing with the route of the Wall around the settlement of
Alfei Menashe. The Court unanimously rejected the arguments of the Palestinian
petitioners that the construction of the Wall in occupied territory was illegal. The
Supreme Court did not address the legality of the Israeli settlements under international
law, and agreed with the Israeli Government‘s arguments about why the Wall could not
be built on the 1949 Green Line. The Court found that the protection of Israeli settlers
beyond the Green Line and Israeli citizens living close to the Green Line were adequate
justification for construction of the Wall. However, as in Beit Sourik, the Supreme Court
went on to find that the particular section of the Wall in the northern West Bank had a
serious impact on the five Palestinian villages neighbouring Alfei Menashe, and therefore
failed the Court‘s proportionality test.
140. In Mara’abe, the Supreme Court explicitly rejected the International Court of
Justice‘s ruling in Advisory Opinion. The Supreme Court stated that the Advisory Opinion
was not binding, primarily because the International Court did not have an adequate
factual record to properly assess Israel‘s difficult security-military needs. The Supreme
Court also faulted the ICJ for failing to proportionally assess the impact of different
segments of the Wall. For additional academic viewpoints contrasting the two Israeli
Supreme Court decisions with the Wall Opinion, see Aeyal M. Gross, ―The Construction
of a Wall Between The Hague and Jerusalem: The Enforcement and Limits of
Humanitarian Law and the Structure of Occupation‖, 19 Leiden J. Int'l L. 1 (2006);
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Victor Kattan, ―The Legality of the West Bank Wall: Israel's High Court of Justice v. the
International Court of Justice,‖ 40 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 1425; Charles F. Martel, ―Give
Peace a Chance: How Considering Peace Process Obligations Would Have Improved the
Rulings of the International Court of Justice and the Israeli Supreme Court on the Israeli
Security Barrier,‖ 17 Duke J. Comp. & Int'l L. 305 (2007); Iain Scobbie, ―Regarding/
Disregarding: The Judicial Rhetoric of President Barak and the International Court of
Justice's Wall Advisory Opinion,‖ 5 Chinese J. Int'l L. 269 (2006).

6. Resolution 242

141. The United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 242 on 22
November 1967, under Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations, its single most
famous, most widely cited and most contentious pronouncement. In the aftermath of the
June 1967 war between Israel and its Arab neighbours, the Resolution was designed by
its drafters to provide a comprehensive framework for a ‗just and lasting‘ peace in the
region. Resolution 242 initiated the international diplomatic process that has since guided
all major peace initiatives for the final settlement of the Israeli-Arab and IsraeliPalestinian conflict. Every major player in the Middle East peace process has accepted
Resolution 242 as a cornerstone document of political and legal principles, and every
peace agreement or significant diplomatic statement on the issue has included an explicit
reference to it. Yet, the Resolution has also acquired a range of contradictory
interpretations, in part because of its centrality to the intense legal debate over the
conflict, and in part because of its seemingly ambiguous wording.
142. Resolution 242 sets out six major principles for ―the establishment of a just and
lasting peace in the Middle East.‖ First, the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from
territories that it occupied in the conflict; Second, the termination of all claims or states of
belligerency, respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence
of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized
boundaries free from threats or acts of force; Third, freedom of navigation through
international waterways; Fourth, a just settlement of the refugee problem; Fifth, a
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guarantee of the territorial inviolability and political independence of every state in the
area; and Sixth, these principles would be informed by the framework of the Charter of
the United Nations and the ―inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war‖.
Resolution 242 was primarily drafted by the British Ambassador to the United Nations,
Lord Caradon, based on earlier proposed resolutions advanced by other countries in the
General Assembly and the Security Council. [Sidney Bailey, The Making of Resolution
242, 1985; A. Lall, The UN and the Middle East Crisis, 1967, 1968]

143. The central controversy surrounding the meaning of Resolution 242 is whether
Israel is required to withdraw from all of the territory it conquered in 1967. The
controversy arises from the choice of words in paragraph 1(i): ―Withdrawal of Israel
armed forces from territory occupied in the recent conflict‖. Much of the debate has
focused on the absence of words such as ―all‖ or ―the‖ before ―territory‖ in the phrase,
and whether the absence of these words was intended to permit Israel to retain some of
the conquered territory. The ambiguity of the phrase, and the legal and political involved,
has driven much of the debate since.

144. The long debate over the meaning of the phrase began during the Security Council‘s
deliberations on the adoption of Resolution 242 on 22 November 1967. All fifteen
members of the UNSC spoke during the deliberations, and a majority of members
pronounced their views on paragraph 1(i). Eight of the members – the Soviet Union,
Bulgaria, Argentina, Brazil, Ethiopia, Mali, Nigeria and India – stated explicitly in their
speeches that the Resolution called for the complete withdrawal of the Israeli military
from the Arab territories. Two countries – the United Kingdom and France – were less
emphatic in their speeches, but both made direct reference to the relationship between the
withdrawal provision and the inadmissibility principle. Japan also mentioned the
inadmissibility principle in its speech, but without drawing reference to the relationship.
The remaining four members – Canada, China (Taiwan), Denmark and the United States
– made no express reference in their speeches to the withdrawal provision. No member of
the Security Council stated during the deliberations that the withdrawal provision meant
that Israel could retain territory. The only express comments made during the
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deliberations that pointed to the purported significance of the missing word(s) were from
the Israeli Ambassador to the United Nations, Abba Eban, who spoke as a non-UNSC
member. Foreshadowing the subsequent controversy, he argued that: ―The most
important words in most languages are short words, and every word, short or long, which
is not in the text, is not there because it was deliberately concluded that it should not be
there.‖ [UNSCOR, 1382nd Meeting (22 November 1967)].

145. The legal and diplomatic debate over the meaning of Resolution 242 encompasses
three main issues. First, some legal scholars and diplomats have argued that the absence
of ―the‖ or ―all‖ in the withdrawal paragraph was deliberate and intended to permit Israel
to retain control and, eventually, sovereignty over some of the lands captured in June
1967. Lapidoth has written that the withdrawal provision‘s indefinite language means that
the provision is clear and unambiguous in favour of Israel‘s acquisition of some of the
conquered territories. [R. Lapidoth, ―Security Council Resolution 242 at Twenty Five‖
(1992), 26 Israel Law Review 295]. Rostow and Goldberg maintained that the missing
words were a deliberate choice of the Security Council, and could only mean that it
endorsed territorial retention by Israel [Rostow, ―The Perils of Positivism: A Response to
Professor Quigley‖ (1992), 2 Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law 229;
Goldberg, ―United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 and the Prospects for Peace
in the Middle East‖ (1973), 12 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 187]. Taking the
opposite view, McHugo has argued that the absence of the words ―all‖ or ―the‖ does not
imply that ―some‖ was intended. As an example, he points to paragraph 2(a) of the
Resolution – ―For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in
the area‖ – and notes that there are a number of waterways in the region, and the absence
of ―all‖ before the term ―international waterways‖ cannot mean that the Security Council
intended the guarantee to apply to only some of them [McHugo, ―Resolution 242: A
Legal Reappraisal of the Right-Wing interpretation of the Withdrawal Phrase with
Reference to the Conflict Between Israel and the Palestinians‖ (2002), 51 International
and Comparative Law Quarterly 851].
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146. A second area of debate on the withdrawal provision focuses on whether the French
version of Resolution 242 resolves its purported ambiguity. While the English version of
the withdrawal provision lacks either ―the‖ or ‗all‖, the French version states: ―Retrait des
forces armées israéliennes des territories occupés lors du récent conflit‖, which translates
as ―from the occupied territories‖. During his 22 November 1967 speech at the Security
Council, the French ambassador to the United Nations pointed to the lack of ambiguity in
the French version: ―We must admit, however, that on the point which the French
delegation has always stressed as being essential – the question of withdrawal of the
occupation forces [celui du retrait des forces d’occupation] – the resolution which has
been adopted, if we refer to the French text which is equally authentic with the English,
leaves no room for any ambiguity [ne laisse place à aucune amphibologie], since it
speaks of withdrawal ―des territories occupés‖, which indisputably corresponds [ce qui
donne une interprétation indiscutable] to the expression ―occupied territories‖.
[UNSCOR, 1382nd Meeting, 22 November 1967]. Rosenne and Korn have argued that
the negotiations and drafting for Resolution 242 were conducted in English only, and
therefore it is the only authentic version from which to draw an interpretative meaning [S.
Rosenne, ―On Multi-Lingual Interpretation‖ (1971), 6 Israel Law Review 360; D. Korn,
―The Making of United Nations Security Council Resolution 242‖ (Institute for the Study
of Diplomacy, 1992]. In contrast, Perry maintains that the French version clears up the
confusion in the English text, and is, more importantly, consistent with the other clauses
in the Resolution. He also argues that both English and French are the two official
languages of the Security Council and must be read together to resolve ambiguities,
regardless of which language was primarily used during the drafting. [G. Perry, ―Security
Council Resolution 242: The Withdrawal Clause‖ (1977), 31:4 Middle East Journal 413].
Article 33 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties states that: ―When a treaty
has been authenticated in two or more languages, the text is equally authoritative in each
language, unless the treaty provides or the parties agree that, in case of divergence, a
particular text shall prevail‖, and ―The terms of the treaty are presumed to have the same
meaning in each authentic text‖.
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147. A third area of controversy has to do with the relationship between the
inadmissibility clause and the withdrawal provision. Underlying this argument are the
imperatives of international law, and its contested interpretation: if the inadmissibility
principle is given a purposive interpretation, then the withdrawal provision can only
mean a complete withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from the 1967 territories. A number
of legal scholars and diplomats have maintained that the inadmissibility principle can
either be disregarded as a dubious principle within international law or it has elastic
exceptions that apply in the case of Israel‘s conquest in 1967. Schwebel, Stone, Goldberg
and M. Roseene have all argued that the inadmissibility principle does not apply in any
significant way to the Israel because the territories were acquired through a war of selfdefence, not a war of conquest. [M. Rosenne, ―Legal Interpretations of UNSC 242‖, in
UN Security Council Resolution 242: The Building Block of Peace-Making (Washington:
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1993); J. Stone, Israel and Palestine: Assault
on the Law of Nations (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981); A. Goldberg,
―United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 and the Prospects for Peace in the
Middle East‖ (1973), 12 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 187; and S. Schwebel,
―What Weight to Conquest‖ (1970), 64 American Journal of International Law 344].
Eban maintained that the inadmissibility principle was a legal concept specifically shaped
by its birth in Latin America, and had no applicability to other conflicts [UNSCOR,
1375th Meeting (13 November 1967)]. Others have argued that the inadmissibility
principle embodies the post-war position of international law, and that Resolution 242
and its withdrawal provision must be read in line with the legal obligations on all modern
nations. Lynk asserts that the inadmissibility principle represents a cornerstone of
international law since the end of the Second World War, and is binding on United
Nations members through their commitment to the Charter. If the Security Council had
intended to create an exception to the inadmissibility principle in international law
through Resolution 242, it would have had to make an express statement to that effect.
[‗Conceived in Law: the Legal Foundations of Resolution 242‖ (2007), 37:1 Journal of
Palestine Studies 7]. Leading scholars on international law are agreed that, in the era
since 1945, conquest does not transfer legal title, regardless of whether the territory was
acquired through a war of aggression or a war of self-defense [von Glahn, Law Among
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Nations, 1992, at p. 376; Cassese, International Law, 2001, at p. 102; Shaw,
International Law, 2003, at p. 423; Korman, The Right of Conquest, 1996, at pp. 259-60].

148. A number of diplomats involved, directly or indirectly, in the negotiations or
drafting of Resolution 242 made subsequent comments on the meaning of the withdrawal
provision. Lord Caradon would state in 1981 that the pre-1967 border was unsatisfactory
and thus Resolution 242 intended – by not putting ‗the‖ in the withdrawal provision – to
permit minor adjustments at Latrun and Tulkarm. He also reiterated his comments, first
made at the Security Council in 1967, that the inclusion of the inadmissibility principle
was vital to ensure ―this balance, this equality, which was the essence of the unanimous
Resolution.‖ Lord Caradon added that he opposed Israel‘s ―annexation of East
Jerusalem‖ and ―the creeping colonialism on the West Bank and in Gaza and in the
Golan.‖ [―Security Council Resolution 242‖ in U.N. Security Council Resolution 242: A
Case Study in Diplomatic Ambiguity (Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, 1981)]. Dean
Rusk, the United States Secretary of State in 1967, said in his memoirs that he wanted to
see the pre-1967 border on the West Bank ―rationalized‖, but that the United States had
―never contemplated any significant grant of territory to Israel as a result of the June
1967 war.‖ [As I Saw It, W.W. Norton & Co., 1990, at p. 389]. Arthur Goldberg, who
was American Ambassador to the United Nations in 1967, later argued that Resolution
242 ―does not insist upon only ‗minor border rectifications‘‖, based on the absence of
―the‖ and ―all‖ in the withdrawal provision [―Negotiating History of Resolution 242‖,
U.N. Security Council Resolution 242: A Case Study in Diplomatic Ambiguity (Institute
for the Study of Diplomacy, 1981)]. Eugene Rostow, who was the American Under
Secretary of State in 1967, would later write that the inadmissibility principle was a
―murky‖ and ―obscure‖ notion, ―devoid of content‖, and one that ―no one seems to know
how [it] crept into the draft of the Resolution‖ [―The Perils of Positivism: A Response to
Professor Quigley‖ (1992), 2 Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law 229, at
pp. 243-4; ―Legal Aspects of the Search for Peace in the Middle East‖ (1970), 64
American Society of International Law Proceedings 64, at p. 69]. In a contemporary
comment, U Thant, the Secretary General of the United Nations in 1967, wrote of the
importance of upholding the inadmissibility principle:

76

There is the immediate and urgently challenging issue of the withdrawal of the
armed forces of Israel from the territory of neighbouring Arab states occupied
during the recent war. There is near unanimity on this issue, in principle, because
everyone agrees that there should be no territorial gains by military conquest. It
would, in my view, lead to disastrous consequences if the United Nations were to
abandon or compromise this fundamental principle.
[Introduction to the Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the
Organization, 16 June 1966 – 15 June 1967, General Assembly, Official Records:
Twenty-second Session, Supplement No. 1A (15 September 1967), at para. 47].

149. The Security Council subsequently re-affirmed the inadmissibility principle in six
subsequent resolutions on East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights: S.C. Res. 478, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/478 (20 August 1980); S.C. Res. 476, U.N. Doc. S/RES/476 (30 June 1980);
S.C. Res. 298, U.N. Doc. S/RES 298 (25 September 1971); S.C. Res. 267, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/267 (3 July 1969); and S.C. Res. 252, U.N. Doc. S/RES/252 (21 May 1968).

D

CONCLUSION

150. History and law are deeply intertwined in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Both are
highly contested and diversely interpreted by the parties, and both are intimately linked to
the distinct national narratives woven by each side. Central to the Israeli narrative is the
return to an ancient homeland (dedicated to Jews by God) after two millennia of exile,
persecution and the Holocaust, the establishment of a modern State ruled by law, and the
necessity of the unyielding sword in the face of intractable enemies in the Arab world
opposed to its very existence. The Palestinians narrate their history quite differently: after
centuries living as the majority indigenous population in Palestine, they were evicted
from their homeland by a settler movement after a horrendous genocide against European
Jews for which they bore no responsibility, and they have fought back through a
prolonged anti-colonial campaign, against formidable regional and international odds,
ever since. Throughout the conflict, the neighbouring Arab States have sympathized with
the Palestinians, while anxious about the destabilizing consequences of the strife upon
their own countries.
77

151.

International law has been frequently relied upon by Israel and the Palestinians to

support their respective narratives, their diplomatic and political claims, and their
negotiating positions. All of the central issues to the current conflict — occupation,
borders, Jerusalem, settlements, refugees, among others — have legal foundations
grounded in international humanitarian and human rights conventions, UN resolutions,
scholarly writings, diplomatic statements, international and domestic judicial rulings, and
treaties and agreements by the regional players. On many of these issues, international
law has spoken with clarity and principle. Indeed, at its best, international law is flexible,
but it is not subservient to political whim. Kofi Annan, the former Secretary-General of
the UN, spoke in March 2002 of the settled framework of legal and diplomatic principles
that should inform a final peace agreement in the Middle East: ‗There is no conflict in the
world today whose solution is so clear, so widely agreed upon, and so necessary to world
peace as the Israeli–Palestinian conflict‘ (UNSG ‗Leading their Peoples Back from Brink
is ―Duty‖ of Israeli, Palestinian Leaders, Secretary-General Tells Arab League Summit‘
[27 March 2002] Press Release SG/SM/8177). Yet international law has insufficiently
informed the numerous treaties, declarations and agreements negotiated during the long
peace process that began in 1991, and the international community has only occasionally
backed up its many resolutions at the UN with meaningful action. The distance between
legal principles and Realpolitik in the Middle East has repeatedly dimmed the prospects
for a genuine peace in that tormented region.
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